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SUMMARY 
The Spanish people have maintained their reputation as the most Europhile nation since the 
membership’s beginning in 1986. When they approved the European Constitution 20 
February 2005 with a clear majority of 76.7 per cent, there is still reason to believe that their 
enthusiasm has not seized. Nevertheless, the EU Treaty was going to decrease Spain’s 
political weight in the EU Council. It did not even change the Union’s economic agenda 
which implied less financial aid to Spain. In public and elite debates, questionnaires and 
interviews, arguments manifested a multitude of reasons for voting Yes to the Constitution. 
They emphasised different features of how to appreciate the membership and the Treaty.  
This master thesis dives into these Yes-arguments and analyses them. They are conflicting 
arguments that are believed to reflect three different conceptions of the EU’s legitimacy. The 
analysis endeavours to point out which type of legitimation provides the best reflection of 
the Spanish attitude towards the EU polity. These legitimisation modes are founded on an 
instrumental idea, a value-cultural idea and a right-based idea. Different layers of the 
Spanish public and political society reveal that their Yes-arguments are underpinned by 
different conceptions of the EU.  
The researcher seeks to establish to which conception of a legitimate EU the Spanish Yes-
vote speaks. Was the Treaty connected to Spain’s traditionally beneficial EU membership? 
Did the constitutional document awaken a community-feeling that was based on a set of 
common traditions and values constitutive of Europe? Did it prompt self-conceiving rights-
holders who spoke of the EU as a granter of fundamental rights and concomitant 
obligations? Together with endeavouring a reflective answer to these questions, the 
theoretical framework is constantly put into consideration. To apply three models does also 
involve to use them critically and to evaluate the operationalisation of them. The purpose is 
to arrive at nuanced and reflective image of the Spanish people’s view of the EU polity.  
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1. Introduction 
Spain was the first country in the European Union to submit ‘the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe’ to a referendum and the first member to approve it. On February 
20th 2005, more than three quarters of the Spanish voters said Yes while 17 per cent said No 
to the question: Do you approve the draft treaty that establishes the Constitution for 
Europe? In the Spanish Parliament 332 of the 350 members approved it some months 
earlier. It was no coincidence that Spain was chosen to be the first EU Member to vote on 
the European Constitutional Treaty (hereafter the ECT or the Treaty). The Spaniards have a 
reputation for being the most enthusiastically pro-European people in the EU and were 
therefore supposed to set an example for possible waverers such as Great Britain, France and 
the Netherlands.  
Three months later in May and June, France and the Netherlands rejected the constitutional 
Treaty in national referenda. Only 45 per cent of the French and 38.5 per cent of the Dutch 
people voted Yes. When comparing the three results, the Spanish approval clearly 
demonstrates Spaniards’ europhile reputation and attitude. Still, curiosity is attached to the 
Spanish positiveness because Spain was at that time approaching an EU agenda of reduced 
financial support. From being the main recipient of EU structural funds in the 1990s, to 
enjoy only positive balances throughout the beginning of 2000, to end up in negative 
balances in 2007, clearly illustrates how Spain’s economic relationship to the EU has been in 
recession. Spain was about to become a net contributor instead of being a beneficiary of the 
membership. The ECT was not improving this situation. On the contrary, the Treaty was also 
to reduce Spain’s political weight in the EU Council. So why did not the Spanish people and 
politicians seize the opportunity to protest against the proposed Constitution and vote No, as 
they did in France and the Netherlands? Spain’s endorsement was doubtfully directed only 
by benefits from EU’s cohesion funds, which leaves us with the question: What was it about 
the ECT that appealed to the Spaniards so much that they approved it?  
Not only Spain’s economic and political issues with the EU attract the attention here. The 
Spanish referendum experienced a remarkably low turnout. Only 42.3 per cent of Spain’s 
34.6 million voters went to the polls 20 February. This makes nearly 21 million non-voters 
and only 11 million that showed up and voted Yes. This is the lowest participation Spain has 
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ever experienced in a referendum since the country’s democratisation in the 1970s 
(Madroñal 2005:13). Compared with previous similar electoral processes in Europe, the 
record abstention level in Spain was exceptionally high (ibid). Additionally, three months 
before the referendum, 84 per cent admitted to know little to nothing about the ECT, while 
one week before, more than 90 per cent confessed they knew little to nothing despite 
widespread advertising campaigns1 (CIS 2004:P1 and 2). Such Spanish behaviour initiates 
interest about their supposedly europhile attitude2. It makes us question whether their EU 
enthusiasm led to the Yes-triumph or not. While there will not be made more speculations 
about the low participation, we will look at what attitude formed the Yes-voting Spaniards. 
1.1 WHAT TO STUDY? 
Along with making the EU work better, the second onus of the ECT was to close the polity’s 
legitimacy deficit. Opinion polls since the 1990s have shown that the EU citizens have felt 
increasingly disconnected from the Union. Considering this, the procedures available to the 
Member States when the ECT is submitted to referenda, must also be weighed. They could 
choose between national referenda and parliamentary votes. The first channel enables the 
people to express their engagement and gives them a direct say. A widely held notion is that 
this reflects people’s attitude better than what a parliamentary vote does. When citizens 
retain decision-making power through direct democracy, the procedures can be seen as more 
democratic and legitimate (Keohane 2005:5). Still, fifteen EU states chose to ratify the ECT 
in their parliaments – most likely because the chances for achieving a Yes-voting majority 
were greater in the Parliaments than among the public. Spaniards got the chance to speak up 
and utter their opinion 20 February. Their argumentation for their vote tells us about their 
view of the EU’s legitimacy. Herein lies the nucleus of the thesis. By looking at how 
Spaniards defended their vote on the ECT, we are able to analyse how they legitimise the EU 
as a political system. Only arguments in favour of the Treaty are scrutinized. 
Legitimacy remains as an essential term in this study. The notion of legitimacy can be used 
in different ways, referring to divergent situations3. However, legitimacy is believed to be a 
key resource in every political system and is often recognised as acceptable acts of 
Government, although it does not refer to a specific type of governance (Abromeit and Wolf 
                                              
1 http://politics.guardian.co.uk/eu/comment/0,9236,1419206,00.html (06 October 2005) 
2 See how Spain is illustrated as a Europeanist country http://constitucion.blogspot.com/2004/07/vota-si.html  (13 November 2005) 
3 See Lord 2000; Lord and Magnette 2002. 
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2005:3). The concept of legitimacy is assumed to vary between societies (Beetham 1991). In 
liberal democratic societies, there are supposedly three elements to legitimacy. These are the 
performance of institutions; their conformity to democratic values of consent, representation 
and accountability; and political identity (Lord 2000:3). Based on this interpretation of 
legitimacy it is necessary to recognise that there is neither one common agreement of what a 
legitimate EU political system involves, nor does this apply to the Spanish society.  
The EU’s legitimacy has emerged as a debated subject because its fundamental principles 
and telos have remained ambiguous (Eriksen and Fossum 2002). It is said that legitimacy 
complies with the criteria of congruence and accountability (Eriksen and Fossum 2000:21) 
which denotes that a legitimate EU polity must adhere to principles of liberty, equality, 
security and participation. Here the term democratic legitimacy arises and needs to be 
distinguished from mere legitimacy. Democratic legitimacy includes aspects of formal 
legality, normative acceptability and empirical acceptance of the political system (Abromeit 
2000 in Abromeit and Wolf 2005:3). While the latter refers to the citizens’ direct 
engagement in collective law- and decision-making where opinions are shared, the 
normative aspect refers to the polity’s need to reflect the people’s acceptance of the process 
through which the public will is formed (Eriksen and Fossum 2005:68). Democratic 
legitimacy is said to emanate from the process through which a common will is formed on 
the basis of the right that all have to participate in collective deliberation (ibid). To some 
people, these qualities do not pertain to the Union’s field of competence. They contend that 
democratic legitimacy remains with the nation-states and consider the EU legitimate only 
when the system provides the members with discernable results. Two other perspectives 
contend that the Union is inclined to obtain democratic legitimacy. The EU polity relies thus 
on the reconciliation of common values or on citizens’ public participation on EU level.  
The ECT activated public engagement and enthusiasm towards European integration, but it 
also stimulated scepticism towards an EU whose nature was feared to become increasingly 
supranational. An interesting issue that arises here concerns how different people evaluate 
the commitments of the ECT. Since the notion of legitimacy may vary between societies, it 
is necessary to comprehend how to categorise these different views of legitimacy. In this 
study, it is believed that the Spanish arguments used to support the ECT, reveal the variety 
of Spanish conceptions of the EU’s legitimacy. This generates a main question: Which 
conceptions of the EU’s legitimacy motivated the Spanish people to vote Yes to the ECT? 
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1.2 WHY STUDY THIS? 
Why study how the Spaniards view the Union’s legitimacy? First of all, there is a 
considerable vagueness as to what type of political order the EU is developing into. The 
dynamic character of the EU has made its complexity and novelty a hot subject among 
researchers. The Laeken Declaration (2001), that built the groundwork for the ECT, asserted 
that the EU stands at a crossroads, a defining moment in its existence. By a crossroads, it is 
meant that there is a range of visions about the EU’s different developmental pathways in the 
future as to what sort of democratic legitimacy the EU polity might achieve. The 
constitutional suggestion simply furthered the discussion on what sort of political entity the 
EU was and ought to become. As Fossum and Trenz (2005:3) said: The constitution making 
process is a particularly opportune instance for clarifying the dynamics of social and 
political integration in Europe, (…). The ECT introduced a political moment that enables us 
to define the EU polity’s legitimacy. The Spanish approval and its argumentative foundation 
are thought to reveal the Spanish population’s view of democratic legitimacy.  
Secondly, that Spain’s relationship to the Union prior to the referendum had implied 
reductions in economic aid and that the ECT would cause a cut of political influence, gave 
the Spanish people an obvious motive for voting No. Against these odds, Spaniards made a 
clear firm Yes. What made them find alternative ways to defend their Europeanism and to 
further the European integration process? What thirdly triggers this analysis is that the EU 
proposed a Constitution that refers to a concept with deep implications and symbolism. The 
prospect of a Constitution for Europe had not been referred to by the EU itself before the 
Laeken Declaration (2001:24) announced: this simplification and reorganisation might (…) 
lead in the long run to the adoption of a constitutional text in the Union? Since a 
Constitution is referred to as rules about the rules that prescribe how collective decision-
making processes are being constructed within a polity and that provide the people with 
general models of political community (Elster 1994 in Abromeit and Wolf 2005:2), it is 
reasonable to think that Europeans become especially engaged in what degree a European 
Constitution reflects their interests. As Estrella Pedrola, Representative from the Spanish 
Parliament described the ECT: It establishes the institutionalisation of the Union’s symbols; 
together with flag and hymn, the ECT unites the Union’s diversity (CO 08/02/05). The name 
of the document is assumed to have spurred a distinct type of debate which might even have 
generated a change in Spaniards’ self-conceptions as Europeans. Its symbolism triggered 
perhaps the establishment of a European demos within the Spanish society.  
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Finally, the Spanish people are known for its pro-European attitude; their Europeanism. 
Since the Spanish referendum can tell us about the sort of legitimation Spaniards grant the 
EU, it is opportune to make an assessment on their positiveness. What founds the positive 
Spanish attitude? It is possible to construct some assumptions on why Spaniards have a 
europhile posture. Some social, cultural and political features play a special role to the 
Spanish people. There features give explanations to why there are different conceptions of 
the EU’s legitimacy. It seems like three criteria decide which view of the EU’s legitimacy is 
adopted. They generate from the EU’s efficiency, values and rights. 
1.2.1 A beneficial and efficient membership 
Spaniards might assess EU membership as advantageous and their interests are based on 
utility calculations. The background to such an assumption derives from the fact that Spain 
has received a considerable amount of EU funds since joining the European Community in 
1986. From 1986 to 2005, Spain received more than they contributed (Torreblanca 2005b:8). 
Spain was the main recipient of EU money until the aftermath of the Eastern Enlargement4. 
The positive balance meant an average return of €1.85 for each euro Spain has contributed to 
the budget (ibid). After the Enlargement, Spain was promised more influence in political 
terms as compensation. If we take Spain’s gainful position into consideration, we can 
assume that Spaniards expect to continue to profit from the membership and believe that by 
approving the ECT, the chance for fulfilling this anticipation will increase.  
However, some have claimed that Spain (…) ran the highest risk of losing at least 30 per 
cent of (…) structural funds from the EU with the ECT (EP 26/12/04). Spain’s Government 
met problematic economic issues before the referendum concerning this distribution of the 
agenda 2007-2013 (Torreblanca 2005a:3). Since the Enlargement, Spain had experienced a 
loss of financial help from EU institutions partly because the average income for the Spanish 
population in 2003 was representing 87% of the average income in the EU (Torreblanca 
2005b:3). With 10 poorer members, Spain’s per capita income amounted to 95% of the EU’s 
average. This led to that Spain lost its entitlement for Cohesion Funds (ibid). The ECT 
implied further negative consequences on Spain’s political role and it did not change Spain’s 
future as a net contributor. Compared to the Nice Treaty, Spain’s quotas of votes in the 
European Council was reduced from 11 till 8 per cent (ABC 20/06/04a; SH 18/02/05).  
                                              
4 http://www.cidob.org/castellano/publicaciones/Anuarios/2003/18anexgastosue_271-273.pdf (2006, January 3). 
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Assuming that Spaniards have tended to associate EU membership with economic and 
political progress which has decelerated lately and was not improved by the ECT, it is 
somewhat remarkable that more than three quarters of the voting Spaniards said Yes. If the 
Spanish people had based their conception of the EU cooperation only on its utility and 
economic benefits, the referendum in February had been a worthy opportunity for them to 
express dissatisfaction with the economic and political cuts Spain experienced. Certainly, the 
silent public might absorb a certain number of discontented Spaniards. Still, Spain’s reduced 
weight in the EU together with an almost 77 per cent approval, do not intuitively lead us to 
think that the Spanish people view the ECT as a gainful move. There must be other purposes 
and other ambitions with the ECT that formed their Yes. As such, there is undoubtedly a 
need of further assumptions on why they supported this proposed Constitution. 
1.2.2 European identification 
It has been claimed that the European cooperation needs a broader perspective than based on 
material gains if it is not to decay into a mere market (Habermas 2001:9). An increasingly 
held notion is that EU members seek more than just economic benefits from the Union. They 
seek a community where identities are unified and where different cultures and common 
values are integrated and agreed upon (Eriksen and Fossum 2004:6). This leads us to the 
second view that explains the Spaniards’ strong affiliation to Europe. As Carlos Closa 
(2001:2) described Spain’s political relation to Europe: It is deeply rooted in a historically 
constructed perception that takes Europe as point of reference for the Spanish identity itself.  
It can be detected two reasons to why the Spanish people feel such an affiliation to the 
European identity. On the one hand, Spain’s relationship to Europe was until Franco’s death 
dominated by an impression of being different from the rest of Europe (Closa and Heywood 
2004:31). Religion is believed to have had a powerful influence on preventing the Spanish 
society to modernise at that time (Closa 2001:2). After Franco, wish for economic and 
political progress arose, for European recognition and for inclusion in common European 
form of life and shared cultural traditions (Morán 1993:286). With EC/EU membership, a 
European dimension accelerated in consolidation of democratic beliefs and attitudes among 
the Spanish population (ibid:287). This European identification is believed to still be 
developing progressively. Spain has experienced the closest link between its own project for 
national regeneration in this century and European integration, where Spanish and 
European identity are seen as a developing symbiosis (Closa 2001:6).  
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On the other hand, there are basic values ingrained in specific groups in Spain that make 
them identify strongly to their regions. These people are believed to consider themselves as 
more European than Spanish. In the Basque Country and Catalonia, there is a cultural and 
linguistic distance to the Spanish State. They are historic nationalities that have a strong 
sense of regional identity (Closa and Heywood 2004:84). It was with the EC-membership 
that these regions were enabled to express regional identity feelings which had been severely 
repressed by Franco’s regime (Morán 1993:287; Encarnación 2001/02:36). A European 
identity and adherence are assumed to be desirable for these regions because they see that 
the EU recognises their cultural foundation and acknowledges their regional identities (Closa 
2001:12; ECT 2004:89). Hence, since the EU has assigned an active role to regions, which 
has progressively grown (Closa and Heywood 2004:83), it is assumed that the Catalans’ and 
Basques’ affiliation to Spain as a nation is more remote than to the European community. 
All in all, Spain’s historical self-centrism, regional affiliation and its political effects are 
believed to be key factors that connect the Spaniards to Europe. This relation is believed to 
be influential and important in determining how much of a European identification exists in 
the Spanish hearts. The approval of the ECT stems thus from a Spanish inclination to feel 
more European than before and from their desire to preserve this identification. 
1.2.3 A young democracy 
The third reason to understand the Spanish Yes is Spain’s relation to democracy. The 
Spanish people have associated the EU with the end of isolation and with the transformation 
to democratic rule, liberty and fundamental rights (Jiménez 2005). The reason to this was the 
political transition from dictatorship to democracy in 1975 which was a turning point for 
Spain in political and economic matters. By the time of Franco’s death, even Francoists 
regarded the authoritarian regime as an impediment to modernization and demanded a return 
to democracy (Encarnación 2001:42). Before Franco’s regime, the country’s only significant 
attempt at living under a democratic system was the brief and chaotic Second Republic in the 
1930s (ibid:35). To obtain EC-membership in 1986, Spain had to re-establish an acceptable 
democracy and to pursue a stable political and economic set of policies. Spain chose 
democracy over industrial restructuring and proved which values had precedence (ibid:41).  
Spaniards are believed to regard the EU membership as a symbol of democratic safety and 
political progress. Closa (2001:4) described the EU’s strategy as enabling the democratic 
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opposition [against Franco] in Spain to identify democracy with membership of the EU. Due 
to the authoritarian past with Franco, Spaniards are believed to have a special need to defend 
democratic rights obtained through EU membership. The Spanish people are seen as 
ambitious in the struggle for democratic principles and the dispersal of these in the EU 
(Closa 2004:335). The regions are also believed to strive for European rights as a result of 
being politically suppressed under Franco and even now, someone would claim. Although 
the Spanish Constitution (1978:art.2) gave all regions rights to seek home rule, it is 
reasonable to believe that certain regions wish to be judicially recognised by the EU and 
recognise EU law rather than Spanish law. All in all, the Spanish population and especially 
the regions have lived a suppressed political life where fundamental rights were first 
introduced by the European community.  For this reason, they are believed to connect 
justice, liberty and judicial security to European integration. This is also seen to engender a 
self-entitlement of being a European citizen. The third assumption is thus that Spaniards 
want the EU to obtain ascendancy over national rule in order to obtain more democratic rule 
and ensure the dispersal of fundamental rights. The ECT was viewed as a step towards this 
post-national EU system giving it a Constitution.  
1.3 HOW TO DO THIS? 
This study will be based on Spanish debates from prior to the referendum in February and 
where utterances made in favour of the ECT will be used as objects of analysis. The 
assumptions made above indicate plausible reasons to why the Spanish population approved 
the ECT. They serve as a guidance to know where and what to look for in the Spanish 
debates. With ambitions to fully comprehend the legitimate foundation inherent in the 
Spanish positive attitude towards the EU, the theoretical framework is presumed to conduct 
this thesis towards plausible and credible conclusions. 
The reason to study only the Yes-arguments is twofold. The first is of methodological origin 
and implies that Yes-arguments are thought to indicate more clearly how Spaniards view the 
EU membership. The ones that argued against the ECT had a less detectable attitude and 
opinion about the EU. They often criticised the campaigns or the political parties. Similar to 
the French and Dutch debates, national politics tended to be more in focus in the No-
argumentation. The second reason is that Spaniards had a good reason for voting No as a 
result of the decreased EU funds and the political loss within the EU Council the ECT would 
bring. This makes the Yes-vote more interesting to scrutinise. 
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The EU stands at a crossroads and the European constitutional future is uncertain. The 
political system is continuously in motion and it is not obvious how the peoples in the EU 
conceive of the entity’s legitimacy. They might be envisioning the EU by emphasising its 
utilities, its foundation of common values or European rights. These three generate key 
strategies (or models) based on different rationality and they designate the EU with 
dissimilar legitimation. Spanish citizens that approved the ECT are believed to evaluate the 
EU polity with reference to its efficiency, identity or judicial framework (Eriksen and 
Fossum 2004:437). The models represent the theoretical framework used in the analysis. 
When Spanish Yes-arguments in favour of the ECT are applied to the theory, the models will 
elucidate on which terms the EU system is legitimate in the eyes of Yes-voting Spaniards. 
The first model to legitimation is based on a means-end type rationality. This implies that an 
actor’s strategy is directed by the results or outcomes that best reflect the actor’s preferences. 
The actor maintains its right to veto and has the final say and decision-making power. The 
nation-state’s membership in the EU exemplifies this model. The EU membership rests on 
indirect legitimation, meaning that as long as the Union serves its members by providing 
discernable benefits, the EU obtains legitimacy and the states stay in the EU. Democratic 
legitimacy is always recognised with the nation-state and retains with the nation-state. The 
EU membership is hence directed by pure instrumentality. 
The second model to legitimation has its foundation in a value-based mode of rationality. 
This means that an actor’s conduct and preferences are formed by norms and values that 
have derived from its surroundings. Here the actor’s identity is being shaped while it feels 
increasingly adherence to its surroundings. Common traditions, values and norms that exist 
in the EU create a common identity and community of belonging. This requires that 
Spaniards clarify their values and use them to prove their adherence to the Union.  
The third model, legitimation through rights, is based on mutual recognition and respect for 
the individual’s uniqueness where political participation is motivated. Policy-makers must 
justify their actions through discourse in order to achieve a legitimate polity, and those 
affected by the polity must be included in the process. As such all policy-making relies on 
democratic rule where all citizens will recognise themselves as being right holders and 
authors of the law. By representing the diversity of the EU peoples’ will and reflecting their 
opinion, the EU achieves democratic legitimacy. 
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2. Theoretical framework  
The EU’s legitimacy was presented and defined earlier but needs to be explained in 
theoretical terms. Traditionally the legitimacy of the EU has been related to its outcomes and 
hence founded on the Union’s performance and utility towards its members. From a 
democratic perspective, the EU has been viewed as dependent on the Member States’ 
democratic legitimacy. Recent institutional and political developments in the Union have 
rendered the intergovernmental mode of legitimation insufficient (Eriksen and Fossum 
2004:441). The EU is said to be a community in its own right, which implies that it is no 
longer a sheer reflection of its members’ political system (ibid; Fossum 2000:111). States 
have transferred and are still transferring core policy areas to the EU. This means that the 
European polity adopts some state-like functions (Wessels 2005:2).  
On basis of this, a broad debate on what sort of legitimacy the EU actually represents today 
and will represent in the future has been initiated. Notably, those disagreeing on which is the 
correct legitimation mode often emphasises dissimilar problems (Eriksen and Fossum 
2004:436). This explains why efficiency, values or rights are all answers to the questions of 
how to comprehend the EU’s legitimacy and what principles it is based on (ibid:438). In the 
following sections, the three strategies to legitimation are explained. Each section will 
describe which expected Spanish contexts are allowing an application of the model.  
2.1 THE PROBLEM-SOLVING VIEW ON LEGITIMATION 
The problem-solving notion departs from an instrumental basis where legitimacy is 
recognised as the ability to solve problems in the way that best conforms to the preferences 
of a specific actor (Fossum 2000:113). The purpose lies in finding the most effective way to 
realise an actor’s initial interests and in producing discernable benefits (ibid). As such, this 
strategy includes a calculating element that weighs costs and benefits instrumentally. It 
conceives of the EU as a functional organisation whose purpose is to solve practical 
problems that cannot be resolved by the Member State alone. The motive is to attain more 
efficiency in material and economic terms for the Member State. The nation-state has thus 
established institutional bodies like in the EU because it conceives of it as an instrument to 
achieve benefits. In this way the establishment of the EU is anchored in mere cost-benefit 
calculations (Fossum 2000:114). As we shall see, the problem-solving model focuses on 
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material structures as opposed to normative or social structures that are the key features in 
the other two models (Sjursen 2005:170). In terms of legitimacy, intergovernmental relations 
are regarded legitimate as long as they supply the nation-state with discernable and gainful 
output. The problem-solving strategy has thus a consequentialist view of how to legitimise 
the EU polity. This means that the EU’s legitimacy is generated from its ability to make 
detectable outcomes and to work as an advantageous instrument for the Member State (ibid). 
If the EU membership does not provide sufficient results, each member can and will remove 
its support. This means that Member States maintain with decision-making power where 
support for the EU is highly conditional (Fossum 2005:5).  
The problem-solving strategy further presupposes that the nation-state is the ultimate 
decision-maker in all intergovernmental relations. The state is a self-interested and utility-
maximising actor which is driven by material instrumentality. The nation-state will still 
admit to collective missions and receive obligations from the community if they are to serve 
the state (Eriksen and Fossum 2004: 439). However, the EU is dependent on the Member 
States’ willingness to transfer competences to its institutions (ibid). Only with authorisation 
from the members, which is often stated in treaties, the EU’s working area is confined and 
delimited (Fossum and Menéndez 2005:100). When the polity of the Union serves the 
member, the EU is regarded as a legitimate system (ibid:101). This model has thus an 
intergovernmental underpinning. As democratic legitimacy is only associated with a nation-
state, the democratic quality of the EU emanates from the democratic character of the 
Member States (Eriksen and Fossum 2004:439). The EU relies thus on indirect legitimation 
which means that the EU is a derivative of the Member States (Fossum 2005:5). Member 
States are continuously seeking to remain or enhance their autonomy, and can withdraw their 
support at any time. This makes the EU’s legitimacy not as predictable and stable as the one 
of the Member State. As such, the EU does not represent a legitimate political system.  
For the model to be applied to Spanish arguments there must be deliberation about the 
nation-state’s interests and preferences. Does the ECT accomplish certain national needs? 
Through the calculus of costs and benefits, statements would refer to the tangible effects of 
the Treaty and evaluate these as beneficial to Spain. Arguments in favour of the ECT could 
also refer to improved knowledge and political efficiency that would cause positive 
turnovers for Spain (Fossum and Menéndez 2005a:101). The problem-solving notion would 
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also be emphasised if calculations about the nation-state’s security. Treaty would then be 
considered as an instrument to prevent threats and violence from harming Spanish society. 
As said before, it remains uncertain whether this model will be significantly emphasised in 
the Spanish debates. In the beginning of Spain’s membership, in the 1980s and 90s, it was 
easier to identify the EU system to economic progress due to their political and financial 
improvements (Closa and Heywood 2004:186). That Spain went through economic decrease 
from EU funds and the ECT reduced Spain’s political influence, were two well-known 
aspects prior to the referendum (ibid:193). It is therefore possible to imagine that this 
legitimation mode may fall short of explaining the Spanish arguments. Perhaps those who 
traditionally perceived the EU within cost-benefit terms were forced to think of the 
membership in alternative ways. At the same time, it is not unlikely that Spain’s overall 
profit from being an EU member stimulated people to still connect economic outcomes to 
the Union, but whose calculus would appear somewhat more indirect.  
2.2 THE VALUE-BASED VIEW ON LEGITIMATION 
This strategy to EU legitimation is founded on the idea of a value-based community where 
there is a deep collective self-understanding of what the peoples’ common identity, heritage 
and value basis are (Fossum and Menéndez 2005a:103). This model posits that a group of 
people is shaped and conducted by those ethical values and norms they have in common 
(Fossum 2000:116). This implies that a society is constituted as an ethical community where 
shared history, culture and memories that engender common values, are forming the 
individual’s identity. One person’s identity is thus based on the communally identity and is 
part of an intersubjectively shared form of life (Habermas in ibid:117).  
The model further presumes that this community will engender an underpinning of cultural 
loyalty that leads to improved collaboration and alliance between the people. The value-
community has a profound significance to the people because the companionship that exists 
here connects with their deepest feelings of adherence and loyalty (Fossum 2005:154). As a 
result, people are willing to admit obligations and duties that the community-life involves. 
The strategy also predicts that the common identity in the community builds the necessary 
groundwork to generate institutionalisation of politics that sometimes can go beyond state-
level (Fossum and Menéndez 2005a:103). Throughout this process, common ethical values 
and norms are institutionalised into specific political parameters that render democratic 
 19
decision-making (ibid:104). This is done in order to protect the value-community’s 
uniqueness (Fossum 2000:117).  
Applied to the EU, this model uses the nation-state as a paradigm and presupposes that there 
will be a process of institution building at Union level. The EU is seen as an emerging entity 
that is something else than a state and more than an intergovernmental organisation (Fossum 
2005:153). It predicts that an ended nation building process will form the EU in such a way 
that the people feel more allegiance to it than to their nation-state (Fossum and Menéndez 
2005a:103). This is because the common values realised in the Union strengthen the sense of 
belonging to it. Europeans are assumed to have a shared culture based on common traditions 
and mores. This is the premise for a common European identity (Eriksen and Fossum 
2004:441-442). In this way, the strategy tends to exclude people from the community more 
than to include them (Fossum 2000:118). It may appear difficult to apply the model as the 
EU is a multiplicity of cultures, but if certain shared values between these cultures are 
stressed, it allows application. Thus, its onus is on how established identities are maintained 
and not how new ones are created (ibid). As a result, the value-based model clearly defines 
who Europeans are. It uses cultural shared roots and a set of identifiable values as 
conditional frames to adhere to the community (Eriksen and Fossum 2004:442). 
The strategy further posits that EU citizens realise that they share societal and political 
problems which can be solved more easily through cooperation. In this process, trust is 
needed which is only assured through a common identity (Fossum and Menéndez 
2005a:103). Collective problem-solving generates bonds of solidarity where differences are 
evened out and conditions for deeper and more binding cooperation are enhanced (ibid). In 
other words, Europeans transmit their cultural and value basis into the EU community so that 
they create an adherence to it and form an identity built on a European community of values 
(ibid:104). The ones that fall outside this community of allegiance, who do not share the 
culture or values of the European identity and do not feel allegiance to the community, do 
not belong to it. The community of values of the EU creates thus harmony between 
allegiance and common identification (Eriksen and Fossum 2004:443).  
The strategy presupposes that democratic legitimacy stems from the Union’s own particular 
set of common ethical values and not from its members as the first model posits (Fossum and 
Menéndez 2005a:104). The Union becomes thus a value community that makes it possible to 
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reach democratic and legitimate policy-making and results at EU level. Democratic 
legitimacy is reached through deliberation on the common good for Europeans and through 
the establishment of solidarity bonds between them (Eriksen and Fossum 2004:443). 
However, the democratic notion of legitimacy is not only premised on common values, but 
also on a will of forging a European identity and of embracing collective obligations 
(Eriksen and Fossum 2004:443). The EU depends fully on the peoples’ wish to create and 
form European collectivism (ibid). As Europeans must articulate a common will, the strategy 
leaves out judicial regulations to underpin the adoption of a common identity. In line with 
this, the strategy directs the EU to have a Constitution that is a symbol of a European 
identity and their common values (Fossum and Menéndez 2005a:104). The Constitution-
making relies on a collective deliberation where the peoples’ roots of a pre-political 
community of values and a common identity must be thoroughly and clearly reflected 
(Fossum 2005:154). In order to reproduce a true European identity and assure community 
adherence, the Constitution-making process must last over a longer period of time (ibid). 
When the Magna Carta is written, it will make obvious guiding lines as to who belongs to 
the community and whose values it reflects. Also, in the process of making it, those who feel 
committed to the Union and hence those who are and wish to be European, will be clarified 
(Fossum and Menéndez 2005a:104). The ECT is thus viewed as a way of underlining the 
Europeans’ conception of belonging to a community where they share a European identity. 
The challenge however, is to clarify what sort of value basis the EU polity is built upon. 
Which values and norms are mutual and shared between Europeans which were also inbuilt 
in the various groups from before? This is elucidated through collective deliberation if the 
people underline their sense of Europeanism and if values form this identification (Fossum 
2005:154). This is why the strategy regards a collective process of self-interpretation as 
referring to self-awared European people that speak of and demonstrate which values they 
identify themselves with in the EU (ibid:153-154).  
Spanish arguments that support this strategy will highlight a wish to belong to the European 
community. Such arguments will emphasise how the EU represents the groundwork for an 
identity that the person feels connected to. They conceive of the Constitution-making 
process to embed specific values that make their identity achieve recognition. As a result, 
they regard the Union as responsive to their cultural roots. Their wish to forge and strengthen 
the European identity must be based on already existing values of the Spanish population. 
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Arguments that further stress this model put emphasis on the EU as an emerging entity 
whose value foundation is recognised and inbuilt in a Spaniard’s self-perception. The 
making of a Constitution might be referred to as a way to strengthen the consistency between 
the people’s preferences and perception of norms and values. They will look at this as a 
proof of unity between the EU and them. Finally, arguments that underline a Spanish 
encouragement to submit Treaty commitments because they have a self-perception as being 
fellow citizens in the Union are also supporting the second model. Spaniards may regard the 
ECT as favourable before the Spanish Constitution as long as the ECT is considered to 
reflect their identity and is a better symbol of their values. Yet, they are not likely to allow 
judicial review that could cause adjustments to this legislation. It reflects the very foundation 
of shared historical values and sentiments that are would not change with the EU 
Constitution, but rather be fortified and revitalised. 
2.3 THE RIGHT-BASED VIEW ON LEGITIMATION 
The third model on how to regard the EU’s legitimacy takes its point of departure in the 
individual as a right-holder. This implies that citizens of a political system conceive of 
themselves as the originators of the laws. As a result, laws become reflections of the public 
opinions and provide citizens with entitlements and obligations. Citizens will mutually 
recognise themselves as carriers of these laws. Respect for the individual, tolerance and self-
autonomy are grounded elements in the polity. A collective we-feeling arises when there is a 
mutual acknowledgment of the equal dignity of other human beings, according to the model 
(Menéndez 2005:4). It predicts people to establish solidarity bonds and cohesion on the basis 
of seeing each other as equal rights-holders within the same judicial framework. 
The right-based strategy is further premised on democratic procedures, as in a procedural 
notion of legitimation (Eriksen and Fossum 2004:445). For the political system to reach 
legitimate decisions, genuine preferences of the public must be reflected in its laws. EU 
decision-makers are dependant on a workable public that is free for political influence or 
manipulation. Citizens that feel affected by the polity have the right to participate, justify and 
deliberate on what they find rightful and wrong. They must also consider what to be 
implemented in the law (ibid). This makes the political elite become aware of which 
stipulations to be pursued when laws are made, while citizens become cognisant of which 
entitlements they have (ibid). This forms the reason why the political system will be part of a 
wider cosmopolitan entity in the end of a complete institutional process (ibid).  
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When applied to the EU, the model envisions the organisation to be a building block in the 
development towards a federal, post-national political entity. This institution building is 
stimulated by the EU’s capability to affect Europeans with its decisions (Menéndez 2005:2). 
The polity will continuously adopt national and regional judicial frameworks which results 
in a strengthened European legal system (ibid). In the end, it will have obtained full 
ascendancy over national and regional laws. Its political decision-making will thus exert 
serious influence on the Member States and on their citizens (Eriksen and Fossum 
2004:446). EU citizens do then rely on a constitutional polity that supplies them with a set of 
legally entrenched fundamental rights that protect them (Fossum 2005:160). Only when they 
feel that their identity is embedded within this set of social, political and civil rights, they 
develop a sense of EU adherence and identification (Habermas in Fossum 2005:160). This is 
what creates a European demos and a collective we-feeling. The model’s premise lies on an 
active public that is politically engaged because they are affected by the EU laws. 
A European demos refer to those who are entitled with rights granted by the EU. Common 
values are created after the reciprocal recognition of who the right-holders are. The sense of 
community in Europe stems from being a right-holder and not from common ingrained 
values as the second model presupposes. The right-based strategy can therefore be said to 
provide a less strict frame of who belongs to the EU. Anyone who recognises the EU’s 
democratic procedural arrangements and conceive themselves as reflected in the polity’s 
judicial framework, are entitled to call themselves European citizens. An EU citizenship 
provides people with the ability to rule over one’s equals and to be ruled in turn (Eriksen 
and Fossum 2004:446). This prerequisite stems from the model’s emphasis on 
acknowledging equal dignity, respect for other human beings and its emphasis on the 
individual’s private and public autonomy (Menéndez 2005:4). Private autonomy implies that 
EU citizens have the right to exert influence on the EU’s political system directly or via their 
representatives. Public autonomy refers to citizens’ right to be protected by EU law to 
criticise the polity. These components are seen to intensify the we-feeling among Europeans 
and thus strengthen the right-based political community (Fossum and Menéndez 2005a:106). 
In the extension of this, the EU stands before a multitude of public opinions that are all 
supposed to make influence on decision-making processes within the Union (Eriksen and 
Fossum 2004:445-446). Here, the model confronts a dilemma between maintaining the 
democratic legitimacy a public representation involves and the inefficiency such a multitude 
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of opinions engenders. The model resolves it by directing the EU’s polity to have a 
constitutional structure that is based on uniquely European rights and principles and that are 
normatively uncontroversial (ibid:447). This results in why this view on legitimation is 
dependant on a flexible Constitution that is sensitive to the public voices at all times.  
Further, the strategy directs the EU to have a Constitution that is responsive and tolerant 
towards the European multiplicity (Fossum and Menéndez 2005a:110). It is dependant on 
thorough up-datings and complex procedures in order to reflect the general public’ needs 
(ibid:109). The EU polity is seen as a fusion of national legal systems and it reflects their 
Constitutions (ibid). The citizens’ obligations towards their national Constitutions and those 
rights submitted in national law must be reflected in EU law as in the ECT. The different 
wills and identities are reflected throughout a process where all citizens affected by the law 
are taking part in the forming of it. This process is referred to as a constitutional moment 
which is required in the adoption of a right-based Constitution (ibid).  
The arguments that are presumed to support this legitimation mode point to a post-national 
European entity. Spaniards’ will see themselves as right-carriers and not only as the 
addressees of EU law. Some times, Spaniards will even view their identity as based on EU 
rights and thus call themselves European citizens. However, if the EU is seen as an authority 
that constitutes responsive and sensitive rights towards Spanish preferences, the right-based 
model is emphasised. Spaniards must also feel included through mutual deliberation between 
EU elites and the public, as in ensuring and protecting their private and public autonomy. 
Arguments will further include clarification of which obligations and duties Spaniards are 
committed to in EU law. Finally, if the EU is looked upon as a system that involves different 
cultures and recognises them despite their differences, the entity’s including elements will 
allow application of the third model.  
It might even be mentioned that the EU polity is the authority entitled to grant rights to the 
Spanish people. In this aspect, the Spanish people are self-conceived rights-holders which 
indicate that there is reciprocity from the EU’s judicial framework. These rights are not only 
protecting them, but they admit to be ruled in turn so that other EU citizens with conflicting 
interests or identities are also protected. When the EU establishes a framework that is seen as 
constitutive of Spaniards’ preferences, they are assumed to develop allegiance to the Union.  
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3. Methodology 
What would be the best way to answer the key question of this thesis? What data describe 
the Spanish people’s conception of the EU’s legitimacy? How is the researcher able to select 
a representative statement? These are among the questions that will be answered in this 
chapter. A good research with reliable conclusions requires thorough methodological 
considerations and evaluations before the analysis takes place.  
This analysis has no intention to evaluate all arguments that were made in favour of the 
ECT. It is a single case study that does not have the ambition of generalising to populations 
or universes, but rather arriving at theoretical propositions (Yin 2003:10). Its ambition is to 
study the typical reasons for voting Yes and in order to do that, certain methodological tools 
must be used. These will enable us to create a selection of statements which is predicted to 
be founded on representativity, consistency and validity. If the three models are sufficiently 
specified, it is easier to apply them to the collected data.  
This research will make use of both qualitative and quantitative cases. Even though both 
types are predicted to reveal contextual conditions in relation to why Spaniards voted Yes, 
the quantitative data (the questionnaires) runs the risk of displaying only fractions of a 
person’s argumentation. In order to better understand the quantitative answers, previous 
studies and the qualitative cases are thought to credit or discredit them. This enables us to 
increase the accuracy of the quantitative cases which also happens vice versa.  
3.1 RELIABILITY – TO REFLECT THE TRUTH 
The extent a source of evidence is able to reflect reality tells us about its reliability. The 
same counts for this case study. If it is able to reproduce a true picture of how the Spanish 
Yes-argumentation was, the reliability of the study is strengthened. So, if the researcher 
makes use of sources that are biased and selects a statement that is not representative for the 
population, the study’s reliability weakens. First of all, we will have a look at how the 
selected cases can be understood as representative of the universe. Then we evaluate the 
reliability of each type of source. Finally, we will look at how statements were selected.  
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3.1.1 The representative statement 
In order to arrive at reliable conclusions, one must be able to repeat the analysis and end up 
with the same results. To accomplish this, the researcher must select representative 
statements that are believed to actually reflect general positions in society. It is presumed 
that the political establishment is representative for the rest of the Spanish population. The 
reason for this will be presented below.  
How do we know that the political establishment channels the voices of the general public? 
Naturally, there lies no certainty to this prediction, but there are several indications that point 
in that direction. First, as stated earlier, that was poor knowledge of the ECT among the 
Spanish people. This observation gains more emphasis when Spain proved to be number 
three in the EU with the least knowledge of the Union (EC 2001:17). This urges us to 
question whether the Spaniards knew enough about the ECT in order to defend their 
position. Second, the referendum was not binding, but it was a consultation to the people. 
Spanish parliamentarians had already voted and decided Spain’s position towards the ECT 
(Torreblanca 2005b:3-4). This might have engendered Spanish voters who were less 
involved in the actual contents and meanings of the constitutional text, as it was not for them 
to decide. Third, during the ECT-campaigns a significant number of Spaniards confessed 
that their political party’s vote was decisive on their ECT-position5 (CIS 2005:P11b; Report 
2005:Q3). Previous CIS-studies reveal that Spaniards maintain a relatively high degree of 
faith in their political representatives which may emphasise this point6.  
Fourth and finally, the campaigns were criticised of being too little informative about the 
ECT. It was also claimed that a lack of internal debate in parties, unions and NGOs resulted 
in poor and shallow discussions on the issue among the general public (ibid:5; Madroñal 
2005:15). What may support this fourth perspective is the number of times the ECT was 
mentioned in El País compared to the French Le Monde. The count was made from one 
month before each referendum. While El País referred to the term 508 times, Le Monde did 
it 1214 times7. This may emphasise the claim that there was a lack of public commentaries 
and official debates on the ECT in Spain.  
                                              
5 http://foros.ya.com/SForums/$M=readthreadrep$TH=3818929$F=24$ME=9742446  (2006, April 24) 
6 See CIS Barómetros 2004, 2005a and 2005b in chapter 10; Sources. 
7 The exact measurements are further outlined in chapter 10; Sources. 
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On this background, it is possible to imagine how the political sphere were as a precursor of 
what to think about the ECT and how to argue. As the majority of the main political parties 
and organisations were in favour of the ECT, it is assumed that the general public was often 
persuaded by campaigns and propaganda all the way to ECT-endorsement. This enables the 
researcher to select more statements from the political level than from the general public, 
without running the risk of making a selection that does not ensure representativity.  
3.1.2 Newspapers, the Congress and questionnaires 
If we look at the most frequently used sources in this analysis, the Spanish newspapers, their 
reliability depends on how subjectively informed they are. El País, El Mundo, ABC and La 
Razón were the newspapers that provided the study with articles. El País is Spain’s leading 
and most influential newspaper with the highest circulation of 450’000 daily8. It supports the 
Socialist Party in power today, PSOE, and thus represents the opinion of the largest part of 
the Spanish population at a relevant time. ABC and El Mundo, notably less used in this 
study, are the second and third biggest newspapers in Spain. While El Mundo is placed in 
the middle of the political spectrum tending to oppose PSOE, ABC is conservative, 
monarchist and with clear PP-orientation (ibid). La Razón has also been said to be a 
conservative and PP-supporting newspaper that deals with topics related to the world 
economy. Since El País is the biggest newspaper and supporting the governing party, it was 
seen as necessary to include at least two PP-oriented newspapers in order to cover the whole 
spectrum of Yes-voting Spaniards. El País has also got a regional section for the Basque 
Country, Catalonia, Valencia and so on which let the different regional parties come into 
focus. For this reason, it was seen as unnecessary to include regional newspapers. 
These newspapers have the highest circulation in Spain which tells us that the majority of the 
Spanish population reads them. This is seen as a proof of reliability as they are forced to 
present trustworthy articles with reliable and objective facts in order to keep their readers. 
However, a journalist does always run the risk of not portraying a complete picture of a 
person’s attitude. The journalist may refer precisely to what is said, but miss the overall 
context in which the debater is situated. This makes it extremely important for the researcher 
to evaluate the contextual conditions as good as possible to be able comprehend the true 
attitude of the person who argues.  
                                              
8 http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,1327888,00.html (2006, April 20) 
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The Socialist Party occupies perhaps more space in El País than other parties. While PSOE is 
perhaps given a favourable image, the rival party, PP, is perhaps looked on with critical 
lenses. However, according to the Economist, El País is a deeply serious new daily9 and 
according to an international survey from July 2006, El País was ranked as number nine as 
the world’s best newspaper10. So, considering this good reputation, it is assumed that El País 
is a fairly objective newspaper. Because of this, El País has been chosen as the most used 
source in this analysis. 
Debates from the Spanish Congress are also sources of evidence used in the analysis. 
Compared to the media’s reliability, these debates are seen as more reliable because they are 
direct reflections of what the debaters utter. The researcher must of course make sure that 
she translates with utmost precision and is prepared to evaluate certain terms with extra 
carefulness. This will be further outlined as a concept of validity. Five sessions from the 
General Courts were found treating the ECT as an issue of debate. The debaters represented 
Spain’s different political parties and worked some time as a testimony on what the 
newspapers had presented as their opinions. The Senate on the other hand, was far less used 
as a source. After going through the summaries from the Senate sessions, none of them 
seemed to involve considerable discussions about the ECT. Out of 26 sessions, from early 
April 2004 until February 2005, only four involved references to the ECT. Then, only one of 
these portrayed a type of Yes-argumentation in favour of the Treaty (SN 25/05/04). Again, it 
is demonstrated how little the ECT occupied the Spanish public room for discussions. 
Finally, this analysis makes use of three questionnaires that handled the referendum in Spain 
and some previous studies made by Eurobarometer. Are they reliable sources? They are of 
repute origin; Spain’s Center of Sociological Investigations (CIS). The Report is together 
with the previous studies produced by the EU’s Eurobarometer. The reason for including 
previous studies from Eurobarometer is to increase the reliability of the findings from the 
three available Spanish questionnaires. They may discredit the result from the questionnaires 
or they may confirm the suggested attitude.  
                                              
9 http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_TGRPSNJ (2006, September 26) 
10 http://www.worldmagblog.com/blog/archives/015748.html  (2006, September 26) 
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3.1.3 Selection of statements 
The procedure of finding and selecting the statement must also be explained in order to 
increase the study’s reliability. Before the analysis started, the researcher had to achieve a 
fairly complete picture of the different Yes-arguments both on the political and public level. 
The goal was to get an idea of what were the frequent issues and which terms were used in 
the Yes-argumentation. These allowed the researcher to notice common arguments and thus 
observe the typical terms that could emphasise the models. In the end, these statements were 
divided on the basis of their origin. On one side, there was the political establishment. This 
was divided into the different political colours and some times regions. It is presumed that 
each political party represents one shared opinion about the ECT and the EU. It would be 
easier to deduce which legitimation mode they emphasise when they are analysed together.  
On the other side, there was the general public. The first category refers to Spaniards who 
belong to a political party or who have belonged to one in the past. The second category 
refers to professors, analysts, lawyers, members of different organisations and the ones 
represented in the questionnaires. At random, utterances from the general public were found 
on the internet when searching for reasons to vote Yes, but it was complicated to find the 
opinion of the very grass roots of the Spanish population. The questionnaires became hence 
the best reflection of the general public. Professors, lawyers and people with increased 
knowledge about the EU represent another layer of society that may channel the opinion of 
the ordinary Spaniard. By looking at representatives from both the political and academic 
sphere, the study is predicted to cover a considerable part of the Spanish general voice.  
How did the researcher develop procedures of selection? To start off with the most frequent 
used source, there were some simple limitations to be made to the electronic archive of El 
País. When the term “Constitución europea” was searched for, there was a hit on more than 
2600 articles. First, the time period was determined. In July 2004, José Luis Rodríguez 
Zapatero officially introduced that his Government wanted an indication of the public’s 
opinion of the ECT and manifested the referendum day. Thus, this was thought to be a 
proper date to start the search. The voting day, 20 February 2005, was put as the final search 
day. With this time limit, the archive offered still more than 1300 articles. The researcher 
faced a too large number of newspaper articles. The search was then limited to certain 
themes. The search led to 476 articles on “España”, 91 on “opinion”, 19 on “economía”, 13 
on “sociedad”, 3 on “cultura” and 0 on “gente” (the latter meaning people). As the amount of 
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articles on “España” was so high, the search was further limited to count only the title and 
the subtitle. The outcome was then reduced to 88 articles. “Opinión” was not limited because 
this is seen to give the best illustration of people’s viewpoints and of their argumentation.  
Finally, this total number of articles, 214, was briefly scanned and as nearly half of them 
were not relevant to the Yes-stance, the quantity of findings was manageable. However, only 
a handful of them were used in the analysis. This selection was based on the article’s degree 
to reveal a person’s reason for voting Yes. It was not unusual that politicians urged the 
public to vote Yes, but left out a clear explanation of why. Such an utterance does not permit 
application of either the models. Unless no other statements from the same person were 
found, this source was usually omitted. Since the Yes-stance involved the biggest national 
parties, PSOE and PP, and some regional parties, these occupied the majority of the articles 
and hence became the most used sources in the research. The articles that presented the party 
leader were usually preferred because they were thought to be the most representative of 
each party, but also ex-ministers or other core politicians were of interest. This procedure of 
selecting particular utterances in El País is believed to be a well-considered and reasonable 
method to bring about useful and representative statements. The selection is therefore 
considered to ensure the study’s reliability.  
Finally, the researcher makes use of archives, newspapers and questionnaires that are written 
in Spanish and sometimes Catalan. To use such primary data is seen to increase the study’s 
reliability because they reflect the Spanish scene directly. If the researcher had been forced 
to use secondary data, i.e. translated into English, the researcher could not be certain of the 
translation’s reliability. In addition, being able to use primary sources has equipped the study 
with an increased number of available sources. With assistance from Sonia Piedrafita and 
Fernando Losada Fraga, accurate translations have been endeavoured11. 
3.2 VALIDITY – TO MEASURE CORRECTLY 
It is an essential part of this analysis to be able to see the link between the theoretical and 
empirical world. In order to do so, the theoretical framework must be made as clear cut and 
comprehensible as possible. This treats the concept of validity in the analysis. If the models 
are precisely defined, it is easier for the researcher to acquire operational and relevant data. 
                                              
11 These two work in collaboration with ARENA. They are Spanish students with considerable insight in the ECT referendum in Spain. 
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This facilitates the application of the models to the empirical world (Yin 2003:35). Which 
measurements may help us close the gap between the three models and the Spanish debate?  
3.2.1 Clear cut models 
First of all, as chapter 1.2 indicated, there are certain assumptions of why Spaniards voted 
Yes to the ECT. Together with these, each of the chapters in the analysis will start off by 
posing core questions that are meant helping looking for relevant and measurable statements. 
These questions take up vital elements in each model and thus specify their field of 
application. As a result, it is predicted that the operationalisation of the three models is 
facilitated. In the following, some highlights of the empirical cases are described in order to 
avoid an indefinite procedure of theoretical application. 
The researcher confronts a challenge when the case does not thoroughly explicate the 
meaning of a term. This is especially relevant for the quantitative data, but nonetheless, it is 
also important in the translation from Spanish to English terms. As an example from the 
questionnaire, is the question: Do you think the Constitution will be very good, good, not 
good nor bad, bad or very bad for Spain? When 50 per cent answers good, this does not tell 
us enough in order to be able to apply one of the strategies. The researcher must be alert to 
how a term or expression may be interpreted in different ways. As for the language, words 
like “nación” and “pueblo” in Spanish do not necessarily refer to nation and village. 
“Nación” is also used to indicate a regional or local system. This is also the interpretation of 
“pueblo”, which can also refer to a smaller population that has shared culture or language. 
When translating the arguments, such differences ought to be detected and explained.  
There are certain terms that are expected to belong to one of the models. One of these terms 
is citizen. Is it legitimate to always consider this term to involve a citizen’s rights within a 
judicially structured system? Is it possible that this term may be used by people that do not 
know its exact implications? An example of this comes from the General Secretary of the 
Socialist Group, Diego López Garrido. He said the Spanish people will vote Yes because the 
EU [is] a political entity that no longer is for the elites, but for the citizens of Europe (EP 
18/02/05a). Could he not refer to the peoples or populations of Europe and therefore make it 
less reasonable to apply the third model to the case? Again, during the analysis, it is a salient 
point to grasp the underlying notion of the article and the person’s general attitude. 
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Even if the theory is precise enough, the analyst must be prepared to allow more than one 
model to be applied to a statement. Despite how inconsistent it may appear arguments are 
sometimes underscoring more than one legitimation mode. An example from El País 
(30/01/05a), pictured the ECT to create an improved Spanish welfare system, strengthened 
democracy, individual liberty and social rights. While the focus on improved welfare 
situation in Spain allows an application of the first model, the two latter concepts point to the 
third model. Strengthened democracy is a vague term that could either refer to national 
interests or to the European institutional structure. This challenge is resolved by underlining 
the ambiguity of the statement and then evaluating the general approach in the article. If 
necessary, other utterances from the same person might elucidate its posture. However, the 
researcher must bear in mind that the purpose of this study is not to pinpoint necessarily one 
model to reflect the statements from a person or a party. The ambition is to perceive an 
overall picture of what sort of legitimation of the EU formed the Spanish Yes. 
With these considerations in mind, the methodological distance between theory and reality 
will shorten which implies that the validity of the study increases. There are still some 
measurements connected to the researcher’s own capability of judgment. If they are 
sufficiently corrected, the analysis will also obtain more validity. 
3.2.2 Subjective inputs 
It is predicted that especially the analysis of the quantitative data will involve a great risk for 
subjective assessment. As explained above, this type of source offers questions and answers 
that often lack precision in relations to terms and general opinions. They often miss out the 
individual interpretation of the expressions used in the questionnaire. While the CIS 
questionnaire from 2005 was performed through personal interviews in the homes of the 
respondents, the one from 2004 and the Report were carried out through telephone 
interviews and some times assisted by computer. These two methods are believed to put the 
interviewee in a situation that affects him or her in a particular way. One consequence of 
being interviewed face to face is that the respondents may answer in such a way that makes 
them appear more enlightened than they really are. Their answer may also be presented more 
interesting. The interviewees’ answers are also determined by what is socially acceptable or 
expected. Such elements connected to the interview design must be considered in order to 
avoid incorrect measurements of a person’s position (Hellevik 2003:362). Considerations 
like this must frame each assessment of the quantitative data to strengthen concept validity.  
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This contextual effect does also appear when the surroundings of the specific utterance affect 
the person. If the researcher takes these into consideration, the argument appears perhaps 
differently which may change the application of the models. If this effect leads to systematic 
measurement errors, it threatens the validity of the study. Were they random measurement 
errors, they would weaken the reliability. However, one example is the Prime Minister of 
Spain. He was expected to bear a problem-solving attitude when he said: Spain has with the 
ECT an opportunity to develop into one of the economic leaders in Europe (ZAP 17/10/04). 
What is important here, is that the question left Zapatero little room for arguing differently: 
Would a Yes imply less economic advantages for Spain? He was partly forced to formulate 
an economic benefit for Spain in order to sound reasonable. Consideration like this must not 
hinder the researcher to evaluate the Prime Minister’s statement within the first strategy. The 
point is to emphasise on the contextual circumstances in order to obtain correct measures. 
Finally, the researcher is faced with a responsible task of allowing subjective evaluation and 
avoiding personal prejudices. At the same time, the researcher must be conscientious about 
her wish to connect the findings to one of the models. It is not always reasonable to permit 
application of the strategies.  
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4. The strategies applied to Spanish statements 
In the following three chapters, three models will be applied to Spanish statements. Although 
my ambition is not to portray a complete picture of all Spanish Yes-arguments, my intention 
is to select the most representative arguments or statements, and to find out which of the 
three legitimation modes fits best with these. The basic question is thus; to what degree are 
the three models being expressed in the Spanish statements? It is anticipated that the selected 
sources do not always allow full application of the strategies and that this process requires 
analytical skills. The researcher must also allow critical scrutiny of the models and always be 
aware of the representativity of the source. In relation to all this, it is considered necessary to 
reach a general understanding of what sort of political setting framed the Spanish debates 
and statements in favour of a European Constitution. Such an overall picture is believed to 
make the analysis of Spanish argumentation more comprehensible for the reader.  
4.1 THE SPANISH POLITICAL CONTEXT 
The referendum was announced in July 2004 by Prime Minister Zapatero, whose socialist 
party PSOE strongly advocated an approval of the ECT. The Government soon achieved 
support from the main political parties and there were no significant EU sceptic interest-
groups (Keohane 2005:3). The two large central Unions, the General Union of Works and 
the Confederation of Workers’ Commission supported the Yes-camp12. In spite of 
widespread propaganda that was mainly in favour of the ECT and the ample Yes-stance 
among the elite, it was claimed that serious public debate was not initiated until a few weeks 
before the referendum (Madroñal 2005:4-9). Not until 13 January, the official campaign for 
the referendum was initiated and three days later El País, El Mundo, ABC and La Razon 
presented a free copy of a translated ECT to their readers13. The same day, Zapatero 
reconsidered the non-binding referendum to become binding which was probably intended to 
stimulate the Spaniards’ interest about the Treaty (ibid:7).  
A reader’s letter to the director of El País uttered appreciation for finally informing about the 
real advantages and disadvantages of the ECT to a normal citizen, because the truth is that 
                                              
12 http://www.robert-schuman.org/anglais/oee/espagne/referendum/default2.htm (2006, April 25)  
13 http://www.robert-schuman.org/anglais/oee/espagne/referendum/default.htm  (2006, April 25) 
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we know more about the Ibarretxe Plan than about the Constitution (EP 14/01/05a). 
According to José Ignacio Torreblanca, who published an analysis of the referendum 21 
February 2005, political campaigns have failed miserably to help citizens establish the link 
between the Europe they know, feel and want and what was in the Constitutional text. The 
vote of confidence has therefore been transformed into voting blindly14. Oñate et al. 
(2005:3), who wrote a paper on the ECT in Spain and France, claimed there was no true 
social debate about the Treaty. As emphasised in the Methodology chapter, there was a high 
rate of unawareness about the Constitution. This was among the opposing party’s main 
messages. In Congress speeches, PP criticised PSOE and emphasised that it had done notion 
to stimulate public debate. This led to fewer EU related arguments from the PP-stance. 
An interesting observation, however, is that these two opposing parties agreed to support the 
ECT. PSOE, the governing party in Spain since 14 March 2004, is PP’s main opposing 
party. According to Closa, their view on Spain’s European politics is considerably different 
(Alvarado 2005). This was commented in the Congress by a PP-politician Arístegui y San 
Román. After expressing distress about Spaniards’ unawareness about the ECT’s effects, 
advantages, transcendence and content, he argued that the general public had to notice the 
consensus between PP and PSOE (CO 25/01/05). That they maintained the same posture had 
a symbolic value in itself, which poses a good example of how good this Treaty really is. 
General Secretary of PSOE, Garrido called their cooperation as following a constructive line 
(ibid). What does the two opposing parties’ consensus tell us? It illustrates that the interest 
for the ECT surpasses internal boundaries and a willingness to disregard their diverging 
views on Spain’s integration policy in the EU. It would have been an apt opportunity for the 
Popular Party to take advantage of the situation and gather support against the ECT and 
against the party in power. How are we to interpret their consensus in relation to the theory? 
Does it reveal national interests or does it expose European adherence? In order to answer 
these questions, we must take a closer look at how the two parties argued in favour of the 
Treaty. It will be seen that their way of approaching the ECT had considerable contrasts. 
                                              
14 http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/701.asp (2006, February 03) 
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5. The problem-solving strategy 
In this chapter, we will look for statements that highlight the first model. The purpose is to 
establish to what degree this conception of legitimacy is supported by the Spanish people. It 
is possible that some statements will engender doubt and thus need deeper interpretation as 
assumed in chapter 1.2.1. In line with this, it is important to evaluate and give emphasis to 
the context in which the specific utterance is made. Is the statement representative of the 
person’s position? Before looking at the application of the problem-solving strategy, there 
are some core questions that must be posed through this analysis. Does the statement 
describe the EU or the ECT in economic terms? Does the argument reveal a calculating 
attitude towards the EU? Do they think of the Treaty in cost-benefit way? Does the 
argumentation involve national interests? Do they conceive of the ECT in a security 
framework which highlights a concern for national interest? 
5.1 THE POLITICAL ESTABLISHMENT 
The following findings allow application of the problem-solving strategy. They are divided 
into political colours: the socialists and the conservatives. None of the regional parties 
argued in such a way that emphasised a calculating idea of the EU.  
5.1.1 The Socialist Party - PSOE 
Prime Minister Zapatero is the first one to be evaluated. Quite early in the Spanish debate, in 
October 2004, Zapatero was interviewed primarily about ETA where two questions about 
the ECT arose. He first answered: When our society has been guided by Constitutional and 
Europeanist principles, it has advanced in every field. Then he was questioned about the 
ECT’s economic advantages for Spain. He answered: We have experienced an important 
economic growth, and many thanks to European help. We will maintain this help, but we 
have to bear gradually our quote of solidarity towards the countries that enter. This will also 
bring benefits to Spain. We have the potential to develop into one of the leading economies 
in Europe (…) compete with the most important powers in the Union (EP 17/10/04). In one 
way, Zapatero’s answers seem to be directed by national interests, since he talks about how 
Spain will benefit, advance and compete with Europe. These terms are calculating 
underpinnings. In another way, Zapatero mentioned Europeanist principles and solidarity. 
This would rather indicate an adherence and moral commitment to Europe which point 
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towards the second model. However, even though he describes a community-feeling, he 
quickly puts focus back on how this can be beneficial to Spain. The motivation appears thus 
to be about benefits and not on allegiance. His answer is therefore seen as underpinned by 
national interests. Nevertheless, we ought to consider the contextual relations. He was 
questioned directly about economic benefits which may have forced him to point at tangible 
effects. Hence, there are some uncertainties connected to this application.   
One month later though, Zapatero gave a speech about the ECT where he confessed that 
despite knowing a lot of reasons to vote Yes, there were two reasons of great importance to 
him. While the first was that Europe represents peace, democracy and security, the second 
was if Europe advances Spain progresses (…) and the ECT will spur such a European 
advancement (ZAP 14/11/04). Spain’s progress was referred to as the EU’s financial aid that 
had financed 40 per cent of Spain’s motorways. This could highlight the first strategy if 
Zapatero really predicts future economic progress for Spain with an approved ECT. Or he 
might just have pointed at this help as a way to become aware of that Spain ought to show 
appreciation to the EU. Nevertheless, if we look at his first reason, this does not seem to 
allow an application of the first model as he focuses on how Europe would benefit from 
these privileges. With this, he shows concern for Europe’s progress as it involves values for 
all Europeans. So, the final interpretation would be a vague application of the first model 
while a somewhat clearer application of the second. That he allows Spain’s progress to be 
the second important reason for supporting the ECT indicates though a certain significance 
of conceiving the Union within cost-benefit terms. 
Then, in another interview three days before the referendum, Zapatero claimed that a Yes to 
the ECT would be a good ticket for Spain in times of negotiating on the Stability and Growth 
Pact and other financial aspects in the coming years15. Here, he is assumed to refer to the 
EU budget negotiations for 2007-201316. It appears as strategic to accept the ECT because it 
will give Spain a more powerful say in future negotiations on financial support from the EU. 
While this may reveal a concern for Spain’s economic interests, we have to consider that the 
Prime Minister was questioned specifically about the financial aspects of the ECT. For this 
reason, is not evident that he perceives an ECT-support as a way to achieve benefits.  
                                              
15 http://www.lukor.com/not-esp/nacional/0502/17111855.htm (2006, March 08) 
16 see Torreblanca and Sorroza (2005) 
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In the same interview, Zapatero portrayed the ECT with uniting and strengthening effects on 
Spain. He said with the ECT there will be no more wars or dictatorships, because the ECT is 
the definite proof of peace in Europe. The ECT was referred to as a more unified Spain and a 
safer Spanish and European society. Furthermore, in a speech directed towards the Basque 
Country, he said that the Treaty would put an end to geographical confrontations (…) where 
grand shared values between identities, cultures and languages would ensure peaceful 
coexistence (ZAP 15/01/05). Wars may be related to Spain’s 11 March-attack, dictatorships 
may spur memories of Franco’s regime and the last comment is most probably pointing at 
Spain’s problems with ETA. In one way, these statements emanate from a concern for 
national security and an interest to achieve peace in Spain. Zapatero had earlier focused on 
the Treaty’s capability of putting an end to the separatist struggle of Basque nationalists (EM 
12/01/05). In other words, he portrays the ECT as an instrument to achieve peace in Spain. 
In another way, Zapatero did also say peace in Europe at the same time which could prove 
that Europe has a certain value to him. This hinders us from interpreting Zapatero’s focus on 
security only as a national interest, but also as important for the EU.  
Zapatero did also portray the membership as a two-way relationship that involved 
obligations. When he says that we wish to do our homework soon (EP 30/10/04) and the 
Spanish Yes is a contribution to a process of European construction which we are so much 
indebted to17, one day before the referendum, there is an economic obligation inbuilt. A 
similar description was uttered by a party colleague, José Blanco. One cannot ask for 
resources from the EU and then not back up a fundamental law project (EP 10/01/05). 
Although this would not be an economic obligation, Spain’s relation with the EU required 
something in return which underpins the meaning of cost-benefit. A regional representative 
in Navarra, from PSN, explained that there are a hundred million reasons to vote Yes – each 
one for all the Euros Navarra has received since 199618. Here too, there is an idea of giving 
something back as a result of a gainful relationship, and maybe in order to receive some in 
the future. All together, these statements are to a certain extent assumed to emphasise the 
problem-solving model.  
Even so, there might be more to this cost-benefit relationship. What if these statements 
reflect a moral commitment and respect? If we look at Zapatero’s further announcement, 
                                              
17 http://www.robert-schuman.org/anglais/oee/espagne/referendum/default.htm  (2006, April 25) 
18 http://www.diariodenavarra.es/especiales/constitucionEuropea/index.asp?sec=opiniones (2006, March 13) 
 38
there is actually a European vocation that forms his argument: We must give a clear message 
of Europeanism (EP 30/10/04). This portrays the relationship as built on a moral duty. Is it 
possible that such a feeling emanates from a European allegiance? When a group of people 
has the same identity, it is presumed that they have a particular mutual understanding. As 
such, Zapatero’s homework would be spurred by a feeling of togetherness and Europeanism. 
If we look at Blanco’s utterance, he also urged Spaniards to conceive of the Treaty as 
motivating peace and representing a guarantee for future European “pueblos” (EP 
10/01/05). Here, he reveals to have a concern for Europe’s smaller communities and not only 
Spanish ones. He is seen to frame a European set of common values which would allow an 
application of the second model. At the same time, he used the word guarantee and referred 
to the local communities’ right to survive. Blanco conceives thus of the EU as a protector of 
minorities and as a law-maker. This perspective has a right-based orientation towards the 
EU. Finally, PSN did also utter that The ECT blesses a common area of peace, liberty and 
human rights. This would mean that all the euros Navarra received seem to also have 
spurred a judicial perception of the EU because regions like Navarra are given freedoms and 
rights. Therefore, from emphasising a calculating image in the beginning, focus was changed 
to concern European values and rights. The problem-solving model does therefore fall short 
of explaining these politicians’ reason for voting Yes.  
Spain’s First Vice President, María Teresa Fernández de la Vega, enumerated all the 
tangible benefits Spaniards are enjoying (…) like infrastructure, motorways and major 
security (05/02/02). She measured quantitatively how Spain was indebted to the EU which 
implicitly means that they had to give something in return. Hence, this utterance appears to 
be based only on cost-benefit ideas of the Union. However, she seems to approach the ECT 
with another perspective later on. Another PSOE-politician, Javier Rojo, (also President of 
the Spanish Senate) said on the day of the referendum, a Yes-vote would really strengthen 
Spain’s and Europe’s position in the world19. This was the only statement by Rojo that was 
found. He might have hoped that Spain reinforced its role in the world and only mentioned 
Europe as a secondary part. The whole idea inbuilt in his statement is also based on a 
calculating aspect of the world. As such, Rojo may have conceived of the EU as bringing 
tangible results. However, if it had been all about Spain’s position, why would he mention 
Europe? He had the opportunity to keep Europe out, but still he included their position. With 
                                              
19 http://www.lukor.com/not-esp/locales/0502/20131750.htm (2006, April 03) 
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this in mind, we ought to evaluate his statement within the second notion of legitimation 
rather than within the first.  
Finally, Spain’s Foreign Minister, Miguel Angél Moratinos, uttered early his opinion about 
the ECT. In June 2004, he reassured that the Government defended the Spanish interests, 
through manifesting their European vocation, and they succeeded (ABC 20/06/04a). Then 
the article wrote that Moratinos did not explain in detail about the weight of votes in the 
Council, but that he guaranteed defence of Spanish interests. At first, one could think that he 
is driven by an Europeanist vocation, but his motive seems to be the defence of Spanish 
interests. Here, we witness how Europeanism is used as a means to be able to guarantee 
national interests. On this basis, it seems quite obvious that Moratinos has a result-based 
conception of the EU.  
Moratinos was also observed months later with the same posture. He was in Andalusia 
promoting the ECT when he explained it would bring Spain and Andalusia a future of 
prosperity (EP 06/02/05a). With this phrase, the Minister approached the EU in economic 
terms. Then, he animated the Andalusian people to look back at all the EU has contributed 
to your everyday life and look at the achievements, not only the economic ones, but also 
liberty, democracy and judicial guarantees. Moratinos’ statement is seen to emphasise the 
first model again because he only pays attention to Spain’s improvements. Whether they are 
economic, democratic or institutional, they are national enhancements that have fulfilled 
national needs. Bearing in mind these two announcements by Moratinos, his posture is 
revealed to conceive of the EU in quite a different way. A reasonable explanation to such a 
change in point of view could be that Moratinos wanted the Spanish people to realise the 
benefits they have already received. Spain would also continue to protect its core interests, 
but there was something more to this Treaty that required an enlarged view of the European 
polity. As we will see, to Moratinos the ECT introduced a European citizenship.  
5.1.2 The Popular Party - PP 
As soon as the campaign began, PP showed concern about the lack of persistence the 
governing party had put forward in the negotiations of the ECT. Even though they wanted to 
vote Yes for this Treaty, PP accused Zapatero and his allies for not knowing what was best 
for Spain. In El Mundo (20/06/04), Mariano Rajoy, the party leader, expressed satisfaction 
about the Nice Treaty while the new treaty signified a step backwards for Spain in Europe. 
He claimed it is good that the opposition puts pressure on the Government so that they 
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defend Spain’s interests (ibid). Rajoy’s motivation for voting Yes seems as such to be based 
on calculating ideas. National interests were not always economic oriented. Spain’s 
nationalist roots that had led to a claim for self-rule were seen as prevented if they adopted 
the ECT. Rajoy explained that the Treaty defined Europe and hindered deliriums for 
independency from the nationalists in Spain (EM 12/01/05). 
On December 21, Rajoy defended the ECT by saying, it is good for Spain and for rest of 
Europe, but that does not imply that I will stop pushing the Spanish Government in 
defending Spain’s national interests as good as it can (…) Spain cannot convert into a 
secondary country in the EU’s future goals20. He also said that Spain must continue with the 
Cohesion Fund which he evaluated as being threatened after the Enlargement. In the 
Congress (08/02/05), Rajoy explained that the ECT is the guarantee of a democratic State, of 
the respect of legality since it defies Europe as a union of States and citizens, a definition 
that closes the door on hysterical desires for independence. In these settings, Rajoy reiterates 
a motivation based on national interests. Shortly afterwards, he asked the Prime Minister to 
work and make an effort so that the losses from the Structural and Cohesion Funds (…) 
would be reasonable and gradual (EP 16/02/05a). However, Rajoy did also admit that Spain 
had to let new members receive the same aid as they had received. As the meeting was 
labelled, The European Constitution and Solidarity, it is assumed that there was a sense of 
solidarity and connection to Europe that lay the ground for the assembly. This gives us a 
slightly different idea of PP’s posture. So, although the majority of PP’s utterances shows an 
obvious legitimation of the EU through its outcomes, the Popular Party may also have been 
affected by the common values of the Union. 
Then, two days before the referendum, Rajoy defended his Yes in a plural PP-meeting. He 
talked warmly about Spain’s last 19 years with the EU and said it was a club no one wants to 
leave (EP 18/02/05). Rajoy continued, My Yes is not for or against the Government, but 
because it is common sense and good for Spain. He called Zapatero little patriotic and said if 
he had been in power, he had been more patriotic and gathered more Yes-votes. If we 
interpret good for Spain and Rajoy’s more patriotic attitude, his utterance is likely to reveal 
national interests. Rajoy did not say anything about how Europe would gain from a Spanish 
Yes. He is assumed to have had the opportunity to mention a European vocation or a unity 
                                              
20 http://www.ucm.es/cgi-bin/show-prensa?mes=12&dia=21&ano=2004&art=10&tit=b  (2006, 21 August) 
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feeling that inspired his Yes, because the meeting was all about defending of the Treaty and 
not about criticising the Government. Bearing this in mind, we are more inclined to interpret 
PP’s main focus as motivated by the defence of national concerns. Quite ironically, the day 
after, a regional PP-representative, Francisco Camps, claimed that the party’s Yes would be a 
No to Zapatero’s Government (EP 19/02/05a). Here PP’s main reason for voting Yes 
appears to be to win the next election and to gain support in Valencia (where Camps is PP-
representative). This is an interesting observation which might tell us that the party lacked a 
clear cut motivation to back up the Treaty. While it some times was about domestic politic 
and criticism of PSOE, other times it appeared to be about defending the nation-state.  
Jaime Mayor Oreja, a party colleague and previous Minister of Internal Affairs, uttered 
concern about how the Basque region could fracture the ECT. In El País, he stated: To say 
Yes to the ECT is to say No to the nationalistic offensive in Spain. A defence of the European 
Magna Carta would be the same as defending effectively the Spanish Constitution (EP 
10/01/05). One week later, he put the ECT on the contrary side of the Ibarretxe Plan and said 
the ones in favour of the ECT had to work against the Basque separatists (EP 17/02/05). The 
same day he was referred to on the internet: The fight against terrorism is ‘very present’ in 
the Treaty (…) it is an additional fountain of stability that will solve everyday problems. This 
will make Europe and Spain more stable and secure and create the necessary conditions for 
Europeans to develop economically and socially21.  
Oreja was obviously concerned about Spain’s national security and portrayed the ECT as a 
reassurance for more stability. In this way, the Treaty was in the nation’s best interest; it 
protected them from terrorism and defended the national Constitution. This strengthens the 
application of the first model to Oreja’s argumentation. In another way, Europe was also 
predicted to become more stable and Europeans were benefiting from this. With this 
reference to the EU, he appears to be encouraged by a community feeling of us Europeans 
against Terrorism. This would then be a weakness to the application of the first model.  
The Popular Party was criticised by Elsa Granda in a report published in El País (19/02/05b). 
She claimed that PP’s Yes was more about foreseeing Zapatero’s possible failure (referring 
to a low participation rate) and about exalting Aznar’s ex-Government than drawing a future 
with Europe underneath an umbrella of a common Constitution. Granda makes a relevant 
                                              
21 http://www.lukor.com/not-esp/internacional/0501/17133155.htm  (2006, 08 February) 
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point in relation to how Closa and Heywood (2004:47) described PP: A calculating and 
profit-oriented party that holds a more nationalistic line towards European integration. 
Closa did also characterise PP as a more “estatalista”22 and claimed that PP’s main interest 
was to give Europe control over areas such as the economic liberalisation in addition to 
highly national interests such as terrorism and immigration. This attitude was confirmed by 
former PP-politician Alejo Vidal-Quadras. He said that PP’s Yes proved that PP always put 
Spain’s interests above the party’s interests (EP 06/02/05b). All this reinforces the assumed 
result-oriented PP whose Yes-vote seems to have been promoted by material interests. 
5.2 THE GENERAL PUBLIC 
The general public appeared to have considered the EU through the calculus of cost-benefit. 
When “googling” the public’s positive attitude, only one comment of relevance to the first 
model was found. This came from an anonymous person saying a Yes-vote for the ECT 
would help Spain to progress and help so that things get better little by little23. This 
statement may point towards a concern for national progress. Although this could emphasise 
the first model, the phrase is too vague to be sure.  
The quantitative data available on the ECT, offered two questions that could indicate a 
legitimation through the EU’s outcomes. One of them comes from the earliest CIS. Here, 
2400 people were questioned: with the European Constitution, will Spain increase its 
possibilities in developing economically? (CIS 2004:P8). While 18 per cent answered that 
they disagreed to this statement and 20 per cent did not know, a total of 60 per cent agreed 
fairly or very much to this statement. The drawback with this finding is that it tells us 
nothing about how the 60 per cent voted 20 February or about how they spoke of the ECT in 
other matters. However, what the answer does tell us is that there was a significant number 
of people who believed that the ECT could bring positive economic effects. Previous studies 
made on Spanish attitudes towards the EU show that a stable amount of 32 per cent have 
characterised the membership in positive economic terms (EB 2003-2005). This information 
tells us that the 60 per cent-attitude is unusually high. It is hard to believe that Spain’s 
previous economic upswing with the EU was still generating positiveness towards the EU. In 
view of resent fund reductions and information about further reductions from the EU 
                                              
22 Estatalista refers to an intergovernmental attitude.  
23 http://constitucion.blogspot.com/2004/07/vota-si.html  (2005, November 13).  
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institutions in the agenda 2007-2013, it is remarkable that 60 per cent still saw the ECT in 
economic terms. Considering this, it is possible that the ECT brought about positive 
associations about previous European Treaties. Such an interpretation of the general public 
would give strength to a legitimation through the EU’s outcomes. 
However, as we already know, there was a significant lack of knowledge about the Treaty’s 
contents. We do run the risk that a great deal of those people who answered the question (P8) 
did not really know whether the ECT would help Spain to economically advance or not. It is 
also possible that some people had hoped it would bring economic benefits and since they 
did not know yet, they answered the question as I think it will increase the possibilities. 
Taking these points into consideration, this finding does not necessarily tell us at these 
people considered the EU membership through the calculus of costs and benefits.  
In a later questionnaire (The Report 2005), 2014 people were interviewed. On question 6c, a 
total amount of 89 per cent of Spanish Yes-voters said to believe that the Treaty would 
increase Spain’s role in the EU. Even though Spain’s role is not a very specific term, it is 
fairly clear that it can be related to national feelings or self-interests. Spaniards may have 
foreseen an enhancement of their role in the Union which could indicate a focus on Spain’s 
relative strength towards other EU members. From a different perspective, if people already 
knew that the ECT was about to reduce Spain’s role in the Council, it is more likely that 
other aspects apart from instrumental ones, prompted such a belief. The question might have 
spurred ideas about Spain’s role as European ambassadors, about their reputation of being a 
Europhile member or about their role as supporters of a European identity. From that point 
of view, the first notion of legitimation loses most of its relevance. 
As a final remark in this chapter, the same questionnaire showed that only 1 per cent 
admitted that the key element that led to their vote was that the ECT was beneficial (The 
Report 2005:Q5). This observation weakens somehow the assumptions made above about 
the general public regarding the ECT as a tangible benefit. However, it’s beneficial does not 
imply directly that the Treaty would give Spain an economic profit. A person may have 
thought that the Treaty is beneficial to me because it gives me certain rights. Despite not 
allowing a specified interpretation, Q5 told us that there was hardly anyone that voted Yes 
would have called the Treaty beneficial.  
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6. The value-based strategy 
In the beginning of this paper, it was assumed that the Spanish population was rooted in 
specific cultural and historical lines that would make them identify with Europe. This 
chapter scrutinizes this group of people. It will first dispute the political establishment, 
which is divided into regions and the two biggest parties. The second model’s application on 
the general public is then put under scrutiny. This theory’s fundamental principles tell us that 
the Spanish people would recognise that there are certain ethical values in common between 
the European and Spanish society which make them develop a European identification and 
adherence. It presumes that these would form the Spanish Yes. Such identification has been 
referred to the Spaniards’ sense of Europeanism which is a we-feeling founded on a shared 
culture, heritage, memories and historical events. This term is not easy to pin down in the 
Spanish statements. A proper operationalisation of the word will follow.  
Core questions that can be posed through the following analysis are: Does the statement put 
the EU in a historical context? Does the argument reveal a person’s adherence to European 
values or culture? Does the person utter appreciation for Europe’s recognition of its identity? 
Is the European cultural foundation seen as an extension or a reflection of the national/local 
culture? These questions may help us to see to what degree the statement emphasises the 
value-based model. Just before the analysis, the term Europeanism is briefly presented. 
6.1 DEGREE OF EUROPEANISM 
It has been a common impression that Spaniards have a high degree of Europeanism24 (Closa 
and Heywood 2004:242-244; Oñate et al. 2005:2). According to Closa (2001:6), data from 
the Eurobarometer tell that 70 per cent of the Spanish population felt Spanish and European 
at the same time. Such dual identification, despite dropping to 59 per cent two years later 
(EB 2003b), was reiterated when Spain was measured to be the country that felt closest to 
the EU compared to the other members (CCEB 2004:42) Is it possible to imagine that this 
degree of European identification formed somehow a Yes-vote? If so, what sort of self-
interpretation was it founded on?  
                                              
24 http://barcepundit-english.blogspot.com/2005/02/eu-referendum-in-spain-see-yesterdays.html (2005, March 01) 
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Relatively few of the statements in the previous chapter were indisputably pointing at an 
economic notion of legitimation. Some appeared with value underpinnings or even saw the 
EU as a granter of rights. It appears reasonable to introduce the term Europeanism to explain 
the move from the first to the other two models. Europeanism is thought to refer to different 
degrees of feeling European. The second and third degree of Europeanism depict a Spaniard 
to have a European and Spanish identity at the same time or to feel fully European. They do 
not fear to lose national identity. This allows an application of either the value-based or 
right-based model. However, the first degree of Europeanism is somewhat more difficult to 
pin down. It depicts Spaniards to have strong attachment to their own culture and nationality, 
but at the same time, they feel attached to the European community. This deeper sense of 
unity feeling is either a rooted identification or developed in line with the European project. 
In the first case, Europeanism is spurred by recognition of shared humanist values and in the 
latter case, by a cognisance of European entitlements and obligations. Both types manifest 
allegiance to the Union, meanwhile their national identity is still strong. This has been called 
deep diversity25 which refers to a plurality of ways of belonging to a polity (Eriksen and 
Fossum 2002:16). In particular, the Spanish regions seem to appear with deep diversity 
statements. As we will see, both the second and third model are applicable to them.  
6.2 THE REGIONAL ARGUMENTS 
It was a comment made by Oñate et al. that In the Spanish debates, the risk of losing 
national sovereignty was a non-apparent issue (Oñate et al. 2005: 2 and 26). They further 
contended that no one feared that the ECT would lead to political cuts of the national 
authority (ibid). What strengthens this assumption is a previous analysis that depicted 
between 60 and 70 per cent to not be afraid of losing their language, national cultural and 
identity (EB 2004a). This tells us that the Spanish population did not view the ECT as 
putting their identity at stake. On the contrary, the ECT worked rather as an emphasis on 
their national or regional identity, as we will see in the following. The regional parties seem 
to have viewed the EU as a protector of their identity while Spain was seen as having the 
opposite effect. We will scrutinise what lies beneath the regions’ Europeanism. The regional 
parties that said Yes to the ECT were two Catalan parties (CiU and PSC), one Basque (PNV) 
and one Canarian (CC). Here, we will look at three of them.  
                                              
25 For further explanation on the term, see Taylor, 1993. 
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6.2.1 The Basque region 
First of all, PNV is said to have one of the most regional affinities and highest degree of 
nationalism in Spain (Closa and Heywood 2004:34). PNV’s supporters have even been 
characterised as below the Spanish average of European identification (ibid). That PNV 
called itself profoundly Europeanist during the ECT-campaigns (PNV 2004:1) and that they 
described themselves as generally positive to the European construction, prompts a special 
interest for the Basque attitude26. It is also interesting that this was the first Constitution ever 
approved by the Basque Party (EP 19/01/05). What was it about the ECT that stimulated 
such Europeanism? Which conception of the EU built the ground for this Europeanism? 
When the ECT was translated into Euskadi three months before the referendum27, the 
Basque people were maybe emotionally motivated to vote Yes due to the EU’s 
responsiveness to Basque culture.  
One of PNV’s core issues was to achieve recognition of the Basque language from the EU. 
We may assume that the struggle for an approved Euskadi was a matter of identity 
recognition which involved respect for Basque culture and history. In this way, Basque 
statements were sometimes revealing a value-based notion of legitimation. However, a wish 
for judicial protection of Basque language and culture was also inbuilt in the EU recognition. 
As we shall see, it is salient to distinguish these two types of acknowledgement. 
PNV’s leader, Josu Jon Imaz, stated in November that they wanted a common area that 
respected all the nations, regions, cultures and languages (…) a Europe that respects 
Euskadi and we will bring what is ours into this common patrimony (LR 10/11/04). Imaz 
regarded the EU’s proposed Constitution as welcoming Basque cultural roots. That the EU 
shows respect for Basque identity proves responsiveness to the Basque nation. When he says 
common patrimony, it is assumed that there is already a feeling of unity between the two 
identities as patrimony may signal a sense of brotherhood and sisterhood between 
Europeans. As such, the EU manifests existing values in the Basque culture through the 
ECT. In this way, Imaz is believed to legitimise the EU as a value community. The use of 
which would reiterate the application of the second model.  
                                              
26 http://www.eaj-pnv.com/documentos_des.asp?id_documento=4378 (2006, May 12)  
27 http://www.es-ue.org/default.asp?newid=111&lg=2&displaying=other (2005, November 08). 
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However, Imaz did shortly afterwards confirm his position in El País (29/11/04). He said 
that the Basque Country needed a Europe that advanced its construction in order to obtain a 
recognised Euskadi. In this article, Imaz was motivated by his nation’s right to develop 
itself. Immediately, the EU is portrayed as granting rights to its people and as a system 
which develops a set of guarantees. This makes the third model appear more suitable.  
A party colleague of Imaz, Gorka Agirre, uttered 18 February 2005, with this Treaty we 
advance a bit more in the Europe of nations and regress accordingly from the Europe of 
States conceived as the only depositaries of sovereignty28. To Agirre, nations are equalised 
to regions such as the Basque Country. The total impression of this article is that Aguirre 
seeks an increased respect for their linguistic and cultural nature. In one hand, since the term 
nation may be interpreted as upholding a system of values that encompasses mutual 
relationships among its citizens, a Europe of nations does perhaps involve a we-feeling. It 
would be a Europe that has always been a geographically delimited entity based on common 
humanist values but that has been ruled by politically defined borders like States. With this 
perspective, it is possible that Imaz posits the EU as a value-based community based on a 
common history of mutual respect that has always existed. The ECT allows this Europe to 
advance. On the other hand, Europe of nations might also refer to Europe’s cultural diversity 
that for the first time is formally described and referred to in this Treaty. Such a perspective 
would rather be an underpinning of the EU’s post-national character.  
An official report was published by the Basque party in November 2004. Here, the party 
drew a parallel between the ECT and their political struggle for self rule, the Ibarretxe Plan, 
(PNV 2004:13). We Basques, share the traditional values that the European soul has shaped 
and we adhere with enthusiasm to the idea of offering and imposing principles of liberty and 
justice to this plural (…) world (ibid:8). The situation that the ECT offers is more favourable 
for (…) the Basques than the present situation, which has led to a change from a Spanish 
adhesion to a European one (ibid:10). It seems as if the Basque identity has always 
connected to Europe’s fundamental principles and soul; a connection suppressed by State 
borders. This has made their adherence to Europe greater than their adhesion to Spain. For 
this reason, the report emphasises a values-based understanding of the EU. However, as we 
shall see, the majority of the report’s statements allow an application of the third model. 
                                              
28 http://www.eaj-pnv.com/documentos_des.asp?id_documento=4378 (2006, May 12) 
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6.2.2 The Catalan region 
In Catalonia, two parties voted for the ECT. On the left political side, there was PSC. Their 
leader, Pasqual Maragall, portrayed the European model as a peace maker that Spain ought 
to learn from in order to be more loyal to its diversity, referring to the regions (EP 
12/01/05c). Maragall further called the Treaty a tool to defend Catalan language and culture 
and said with a solid Europe Catalonia will achieve its objectives more easily (ibid). In one 
way, Maragall’s argumentation has hints from the problem-solving model because he uses 
words like tool and objectives, and sees how the Catalan region can benefit from this Treaty. 
In another way, he portrays Europe as a model that is sensitive to Catalan values and 
respects them more than Spain. This might mean that there is coherence between European 
and Catalan values which has always been there. Or it might signify that Europe has 
presented a model by introducing the ECT that better corresponds to Catalan anticipations 
than Spain’s Constitution. Either way, deep diversity forms his statement. Later in the same 
article, however, Maragall said, a future without frontiers (ibid). This expression calls for 
further evaluation in the third model.  
Just before the referendum, Maragall said: The nation is no longer Catalonia or Spain: it is 
Europe and we want a law for the great mother country (EP 18/02/05c). He saw the ECT as 
a unique opportunity and as an instrument for socialists to change the world. Nation and 
mother country are words that can be connected to fraternity and history. Europe is as such 
envisaged as a community based on shared culture and history. That Maragall also addressed 
the socialist layer gives the impression of a European project led by socialists and socialism. 
A socialist agenda is seen as quite excluding on other people and could indicate a 
legitimation mode through a certain set of common values. On basis of such interpretation, 
Maragall’s conception of the EU seems value-oriented. Yet, his statement does also prompt 
another idea of the EU. We want a law for Europe forms an image of a post-national Union 
that provides a judicial framework. Again, the person will be analysed in the next chapter. 
On the political right there was the alliance CiU. They had some disagreements about the 
ECT which led to internal splits (EP 04/01/05). Nevertheless, CiU gave an approving vote 
which the party’s leader, Artur Mas, called a critical Yes (EP 22/02/05). They explained this 
by saying the EU had not yet recognised Catalonia in all its fullness, despite the EU’s 
official recognition of Catalan 13 December 2004 (ibid). Though, CiU described the Treaty 
as not ideal for Catalonia, but it leads to significant improvements towards recognition of 
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Catalonia in Europe (Oñate et al. 2005:28). Mas said that the ECT would be a step towards 
regional recognition, but at the same time, he was disappointed by Spain’s policy on 
regional issues: The problem is not Europe, but Spain (EP 29/01/05). A party companion, 
Rovira Vilajoana said in the Congress (25/01/05) that the Treaty was positive for Europeans.  
There is no doubt that CiU and Mas wanted Europe to recognise Catalonia. On basis of the 
abovementioned, CiU’s position can be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, Europe 
represents a community that seems to favour the Catalan identity. Since Europe is not the 
problem, it is likely that there is a sense of allegiance to the EU. This supposed feeling of 
unity seemed not to be fully emphasised in the Treaty, which led to a critical Yes. Therefore, 
CiU’s posture may have been directed by a value-oriented image of the EU. On the other 
hand, that Catalonia was not fully recognised may have signified a need for judicial 
acknowledgement as in rights and guarantees that would protect the Catalan identity. Such a 
perspective gives emphasis to a rights-induced legitimation of the EU. 
6.3 PSOE SHOWS A VALUE-BASED ATTITUDE 
For the governing party and their leader, Zapatero, the Spanish vote did not always seem to 
be about approving the ECT. It also became a matter of expressing their European vocation. 
The second strategy presupposes that there is a set of values that is shared between 
Europeans. The ones that recognise these values are expected to either feel an adherence to 
the European community or/and to recognise themselves as Europeans. How were such 
values exposed in PSOE’s utterances? Fernández de la Vega, pictured the ECT to give Spain 
back its image as the ‘Europeanist motor’ (EP 06/11/04). The previous Prime Minister, 
Felipe González, put it a bit different; if the No-stance triumphed, the winners would be the 
anti-Europeanists (EP 14/01/05b). PSOE’s perhaps most leading argument was “Los 
primeros en Europa”, introduced by Zapatero. This means the first ones in Europe. It was a 
widespread slogan which is believed to have imposed a sense of solidarity and pride among 
the Spanish population. The following statements shed light over how PSOE’s European 
vocation seemed to be formed by a set of rooted community-feelings. Some regional sister 
parties will also be analysed in the following because they share PSOE’s statements.  
6.3.1 “We feel European” 
That Spain was the first member to evaluate the ECT was understood as an honourable role 
to receive and gave the Spanish people a responsible task in front of the other EU members. 
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PSOE’s slogan was chosen to stimulate the Spaniards’ Europeanism and the participation 
according to Zapatero in the Congress (02/02/05). On October 29, Zapatero described 
Spain’s Yes as showing Europe that Spaniards feel as part of Europe’s institution 
building29. He continued, due to Spain’s late arrival at democratisation, it has now the 
opportunity to demonstrate its wish to belong to Europe. The day after he said, Europe looks 
at us. We are to be a reference (…) let us send a clear message of Europeanism (…) the 
Catholic Church is also Europeanist (EP 30/10/04). Later he wished that Spain would be in 
the first line in the European construction (EM 15/11/04). Zapatero seemed convinced about 
Spaniards’ European adherence. Whether this adherence is historically related or has 
emerged with the proposal of this Treaty remains uncertain. Yet, when he mentioned 
Catholicism, he is believed to have framed Europe culturally and regarded the EU through a 
set of rooted values. On this background, it appears as quite clear that the Prime Minister 
predicts Spaniards’ feeling of belonging to Europe to inform a Yes-vote.  
A similar attitude was shown by José Blanco, PSOE’s Political Secretary. He wanted to 
make sure that Spain realised the importance of being the first country to vote; Europe looks 
at us and we are for the first time able to become a reference (EP 03/02/05). PSOE’s 
General Secretary then said, Spain can not only be a member. It has to lead (…) Europe (EP 
18/02/05a). These statements reflect a sense of responsibility towards Europe. The Spanish 
population has been given the opportunity to prove their European vocation. This 
responsibility given to the Spanish people is assumed to reflect mutual correspondence and a 
sense of unity. These statements are hence seen to be an underpinning of a value-based 
notion of legitimation.    
6.3.2 European strength 
A legitimation through values presupposes that Europeans are distinguished from others. 
This makes it an excluding rather than including model (Fossum and Menéndez 2005:106). 
To someone, differences between Europeans and other communities became more evident 
with the ECT. There were arguments how the Treaty would make the unity of Europe 
stronger against the United States as they were societies with conflicting set of values. 
Without explicitly referring to Europe’s cultural heritage, it is believed that these statements 
emphasise the value-based model because they have a perspective based us-and-them.  
                                              
29 http://www.es-ue.org/default.asp?newid=107&lg=2&displaying=other (2006, March 09). 
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In Zapatero’s eyes, the ECT embodies a social, political and economic model and specific 
values that contradict those of the United States (EP 27/11/04). The model was referred to as 
the work of Europe’s socialists. He further claimed that the socialists must be the most 
powerful voice defending the European Constitution. Here, Europe’s socialism is put as the 
counterpoint to the American model. According to Zapatero, the ECT works as a proof of 
socialism as it confirms which values unite Europe. As PSC is a sister party to PSOE, they 
are included in this section. Maragall claimed that the ECT would make Europe a more 
significant I in the world (EP 12/01/01c). The ECT could help Europe to become more active 
in global affairs according to PSC’s leader, in order to be capable of facing the American 
hegemony (ibid). He further pointed at Europe’s fifty years together which had made it 
possible to develop this European model. With this, the ECT seems to be the result or the 
manifest of common values that have always defined Europe.  
Then, PSOE’s General Secretary, Garrido stated in an interview that the EU is developing 
into a political subject, different from the United States (…) and it is a Europe established on 
its peoples’ values (EP 18/02/05a). This was an open question about the ECT that allowed 
Garrido to take up whatever issue he wanted in order to defend his Yes. This statement is 
therefore seen as underscoring one of the core motives of PSOE’s support. He is believed to 
have a value-based posture here because he refers to how Europeans have developed socially 
and created values together. The EU differs from other political subject because it is founded 
on its peoples’ values. These are hence interpreted as historically rooted values. 
Finally, in an interview with the former political minister under Félipe González, Javier 
Solana, the ECT was presumed to give the EU an international weight because it carries 
certain values and does things differently from other powers (EP 15/02/05b). Solana then 
pictured the ECT to create the most important European diplomatic structure in the world 
(EP 19/02/05c). Despite being the High Representative for the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy in the EU, he is assumed to represent the Spanish elite because he here in El 
País talks to the Spanish people. His arguments are seen to be value-oriented because 
common values like diplomacy made the EU unique as a community. He also pictured 
Europeans to act differently from others which may imply that Europe has a uniting effect.  
One final remark is that most of the utterances above regard the EU as a system that works 
or is starting to work as a proper subject. Apart from seeing its foundation as built on value-
related terms, they also infer that the EU is somehow developing into something stronger 
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than before, but still on basis of a unity of values. The ECT seemed to be a symbol of this 
new role. Would it not be reasonable to consider the Treaty as an impetus of a post-national 
idea of the EU? Does the Union develop into an entity that works independently from its 
members and therefore is able to be weighed against the United States? With this 
interpretation, the utterances above might also indicate that the EU’s development is based 
on historical heritage and its peoples’ values together with a judicial onus.  
6.4 PP SHOWS A VALUE-BASED ATTITUDE 
The Popular Party emphasised relatively few times the value-based legitimation mode, but 
some statements did emphasise of cultural adherence to Europe. Maybe PP’s less intense 
campaign compared with PSOE’s campaign (Oñate et al. 2005:3), was forming part of the 
reason for less statements about Europeanism. Or maybe they did not want to impose a 
specific attitude on the Spanish people as Arístegui y San Román described in the Congress 
(25/01/05). This PP-politician uttered strong concern about the scarcity of public debate and 
complained about how PSOE accused them for being anti-Europeanists. He denied these 
accusations and said that the problem was not PP’s Europeanist stance, but a Spanish 
population that did not include themselves in the public debates. An underlying message of 
his speech seemed to be that it was important to stimulate public discussions and not to 
demonstrate a European vocation. This explains perhaps why the Popular Party’s 
argumentation did not emphasise so much their Europeanism.  
When he acted publicly in front of 600 listeners in Barcelona in October, he portrayed a 
quite vague picture of his EU position. Spain’s future is in Europe and the Constitution is an 
intention for unity from diversity (LR 31/10/04). With this affirmation, PP’s leader may have 
perceived the ECT as establishing coherence between Europeans. This indicates that Europe 
is established on the basis of already shared and uniting principles. However, since the ECT 
is new and if Europe was founded on diversity before, his statement might also indicate that 
the EU is establishing a community now, but on basis of differences. Such a dual 
interpretation would allow both the second and the third model to be applied. Nevertheless, 
he continued; it would be an error not to defend national interests in order to make Europe 
stronger (ibid). This would support PP’s national orientation and thus allow the first model 
to be applied. Finally, in another article, he said Europe is more important than to punish 
Zapatero (EP 05/02/05a). Here, his ECT-support seems to be motivated by European 
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concerns instead of focusing on domestic relations. Even on the basis of the whole article, it 
is hard to tell whether this European concern is underpinned by the second or third model.  
Later, Rajoy said that PP supported the ECT in spite of all the differences they had with 
PSOE because the Treaty was globally positive and because major parts of the Treaty were 
already approved when PP led the Government (EP 09/02/05b), he gave conflicting signals. 
In a way, he presents the ECT’s importance to be greater than national politics, but at the 
same time, he presents his own party as being the reason for an approval. The latter reason 
has hints of political propaganda as PP seems to benefit politically it the ECT is approved. 
The total impression of PP’s orientation towards the ECT was that their argumentation 
wavered from emphasising national concerns to criticising the Government to portraying the 
Treaty as good for all Europeans. As Rajoy demonstrated in Andalusia, there was an 
instrumental underpinning even though he linked the Treaty to a European unity-feeling. 
In the Congress, Arístegui y San Román started off by criticising PSOE’s way of connecting 
Zapatero to the ECT as if it was his Constitution, the PP-politician claimed. His reason for 
voting Yes was that it is evident that the ECT will support a stronger, more united, more 
solidarity-based, more prosperous and more secure European construction (CO 25/01/05). 
He also proved PSOE wrong when they had referred to PP as anti-Europeans, euro-sceptics 
and asking for a Yes-vote with a small mouth. His utterance in the Congress is seen to reveal 
an opinion that reflected a unified Europe built on solidarity. He did not explicitly depict 
Europeans’ solidarity as founded on common values and culture, but between the lines, the 
EU is already strong, united and based on sister- and brotherhood as in solidarity. He later 
explained that the Treaty enables Europe to become stronger and attain a more united voice 
towards the world (Oñate et al. 2005:23). Here, he positively identifies Europe and stresses 
the unity feeling. From such a viewpoint, he perceives the EU as a value-based polity.  
6.5 THE GENERAL PUBLIC’S VALUE-BASED ATTITUDE 
A certain degree of Europeanism was also found among the general public. An anonymous 
person described the ECT as not a perfect charter, but it ought to be approved by the people 
as long as they felt European30. The President of ‘The Union of Women for Europe’ said 
that to vote Yes to the ECT is a matter of being Europeanist or anti-Europeanist and of 
                                              
30 http://foros.elaleph.com/viewtopic.php?t=18254&start=0  (2006, April 13) 
 54
showing nationalist dissonance or patriotic solidarity (EP 13/01/05). A representative from 
the Law Faculty asked, why reject the Europeans now when we have shown them such 
solidarity the last period of time? (EP 12/02/05a). These utterances manifest the high degree 
of Europeanism that exists in the Spanish society and some times by showing solidarity. 
They are believed to emphasise the second model because they portray the membership as 
based on a we-feeling that has always been there. As for the first utterance, this Europeanism 
might also generate from a self-conception of being a rights-holder in the EU. This proves 
how different a European adherence can be formed and underlines two separate models.  
There was also an understanding of a Europe with enlarged weight in the world if the Treaty 
was approved. Aldo Olcese, President of the Institute of Financial Analysts, presumed that 
the European economy would receive in 2010 the leading economic role in the world which 
the USA represents today (EP 02/02/05). The biggest Spanish private companies were 
together when they claimed that Europe’s economic and social welfare system was 
considerably dependant on a ratification and that part of their goal is for Europe’s economy 
to surpass the United States’ leading role today (EP 02/02/05). Even though these 
companies are concerned about economic matters, their argumentation is seen to underpin a 
European we-feeling because they put the EU against the USA. A similar attitude was 
redetected in CIS 2004 (P11a). Here, they were to point out the core reason for voting Yes. 
Almost 5 per cent answered that it was because it strengthens the EU in front of the United 
States. The respondents were confronted with eight alternatives which makes 5 per cent quite 
a significant amount of people. What might emphasise this attitude, are two previous 
analyses that state that about 30 per cent of the Spanish population view the EU as a way to 
strengthen their voice in the world (EB 2004b and EB 2005). To put the EU on the opposing 
side of the rest of the world is believed to underpin the European community-feeling. 
Another quantitative finding from the Report (2005:Q5) is also believed to detect a value-
based attitude among the general public. Q5 tells us that the percentage that voted Yes due to 
their total impression of the EU (33 per cent) was higher than the percentage that voted Yes 
due to their opinion of the ECT (26 per cent). Furthermore, the questionnaire found that the 
first category mainly concerned elderly people while the second category appeared more 
often among younger people. On one hand, it tells us that when the older generation voted 
Yes, historical values and memories may have conducted their vote. This could mean that 
their evaluation of the EU is an underpinning of a value-based notion of legitimation. On the 
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other hand, this finding could also point at a people that had experienced a profitable EU 
period and thus developed anticipations of a membership that still brought about benefits.  
The final finding points at what the EU signified to the Spanish population. While 52 per 
cent of the Spanish people said they believed fairly to very much that the ECT guaranteed 
peace and prosperity for the Europeans (CIS 2005:P21), 68 per cent said the same in the 
first questionnaire (CIS 2004:P11). Whereas this tells us that Spaniards had expectations of 
the EU, it also displays how strongly certain values are related to the membership. Both 
questions referred to Europeans which allows us to interpret the answer as reflecting a unity-
feeling among Europeans. Notably, the respondents did not have the choice to say anything 
else, but considering the high percentages, it is likely that they acknowledge certain shared 
ambitions with the rest of Europe. The ECT appeared as the symbol of these common 
values. In addition, peace and prosperity are considered to represent special values to the 
Spanish people and largely equivalent to the EU because the membership stimulated Spain 
to become a democracy. Memories and historical associations might thus be connected to 
peace and prosperity. This makes it likely to see their answer as underscoring a legitimation 
through the EU’s values.  
However, if we also look at previous studies of the Spanish population, only 15 to 23 per 
cent have described the EU in relation to peace (EB 2003a). The EU is maybe signalling a 
stronger peace-aspect with the ECT than it has done before. This opens up for another 
interpretation of the question. Why do Spaniards connect peace and prosperity more easily to 
the European project with the constitutional document? Maybe it is the ECT’s entrenchment 
of fundamental rights that makes peace a describing term of the EU. If we look closer at the 
question, it says guaranteed. This implies that Europeans have a right to possess them. 
Spaniards may have interpreted this as a protection of their individual integrity and maybe 
felt addressed as European citizens. If so, it could signify that they saw the EU as a post-
national entity which highlights the third strategy. However, since this question did not 
permit more explanation of the concepts peace and prosperity or guarantee it remains 
difficult to decide which of the one models where actually emphasised. One finding is 
though that the constitutional document was connected to values that seemed more acute 
now than they have appeared before.   
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6.6 THE VALUE-BASED VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONS 
The final application of the value-based strategy takes place in the comparison of the 
Spanish Magna Carta with the European proposed Constitution. How is the second model 
applicable to this comparison? The value-based conception of legitimacy requires a 
Constitution to have evolved over a considerable period of time (Fossum and Menendez 
2005:104). This means that the ECT must be seen as a reflection of already established 
Spanish ethical norms and values inherent in the Spanish Constitution. In this way, Spanish 
traditions and memories are constitutive of Europe (ibid). We will now analyse the different 
arguments that took place after Spain’s Supreme Court announced: It does not contradict the 
Supremacy of the Constitution (EP 15/12/04 and Pérez-Roldán y Suanzes-Carpegna 2005:3). 
First, value-based arguments are analysed and then in the next chapter, the right-based ones.  
Fernández de la Vega (PSOE) explained that the ECT reinforces the Spanish Constitution 
because it adopts the same values of liberty, equality, justice and pluralism (EP 06/11/04). 
She further said that the ECT strengthens the Spanish Magna Carta as they refer to the same 
values (ibid). El País quoted Gabriel Cisneros, a former PP-politician: There is absolutely no 
contradiction between the two (…) The European Constitution does not innovate, but is 
consolidates a situation that had already been evolving in Spain (EP 13/12/04). What these 
statements have in common is their view of the ECT as a reflection of a national process and 
consolidates with already established values in the Spanish society. When the ECT is 
understood as symbolising and reflecting the constitutional process in Spain, it is assumed 
that the value-based model gains support. Yet, if these two were asked if they allowed 
judicial review of the national legislation that would entail reforming it, the second model 
would fall short in explaining their position. This illustrates how sensitive the issue of socio-
cultural roots is and how difficult it is some times to detect a person’s feelings and values. 
The general public’s opinion on this matter did not appear in any questionnaire, but 
according to the lawyer Pérez-Roldán y Suanzes-Carpegna (2005:3) the public opinion 
acknowledged that the ECT was perfectly compatible with their [Spanish] Constitution. One 
could not expect the general public to have compared the two Constitutions. Probably, this 
responsibility was left to the political elite and assumingly they had shared opinions on this 
matter. However, as we shall see, the comparison of the two Constitutions could also some 
times reveal a right-based conception of the EU.  
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7. The right-based strategy  
This chapter will apply the final model to Spanish statements. It will start off by looking at 
the two Constitutions and then handle the regional parties, PSOE and PP. Finally, it will look 
at the general public. It is assumed that Spain’s late democratisation made democracy an 
essential term for the Spanish people. When statements refer to how European democracy is 
improved by the ECT, it is believed that they have adopted a right-based conception of the 
EU. The people could also feel, to different degrees, embedded in the European judicial 
framework if they address themselves with reference to European rights and obligations. 
Nicolás Sartorius, a lawyer and the Vice President of the “Fundación Alternativas” (Spanish 
think tank), wrote an opinion in El País (04/06/05) explaining his support of the ECT: The 
Constitution (…) takes a step away from the national citizenship towards the European 
citizenship. This is seen as a typical example of how a right-based statement is formed. 
Throughout the analysis, some central questions may help us to denote possible right-based 
attitudes. Is there a wish for European citizenship? Are the people cognisant of their 
entitlements or obligations in relation to the EU? Do Spaniards seek to ensure the EU rights 
to influence Spanish life and actions? Is the EU depicted as a polity that is responsive to the 
European diversity? Is the EU referred to as a protector of a person’s integrity?  
7.1 THE RIGHT-BASED VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONS 
To apply the right-based model to statements that make a comparison of the two 
Constitutions, the person must not see the ECT as rooted in pre-political values. The ECT 
would be considered to give the EU full state-type abilities that give all European citizens 
rights and duties. If a statement points at divergences between the two Constitutions and sees 
the Spanish Constitution as in need of judicial review of legislation, it may underline the 
right-based strategy.  
One article in El País (13/12/04) presented several Professors’ opinions about reforming the 
Constitution. The article started: Few people oppose not to adjust the Spanish Constitution in 
order to match it to the European Norm. One of the Professors, Manuel Fraga, said that the 
new Treaty goes much further (…) so it is possibly necessary to update the dogmatic 
components of the [Spanish Constitution] (EP 13/12/04). Another Professor, Antonio Torres 
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del Moral, compared the ECT and the national Magna Carta to the relationship between the 
central and regional authorities and said, the ECT is to have priority over national law which 
does not refer to an unquestionable supremacy but to a preference of application just like in 
a hierarchy of competence. Then, according to Javier Corcuera, the best solution, in case of 
contradiction, would be to change the Spanish Constitution rather than to do the opposite. 
These utterances are believed to show signs of a right-based idea of the EU because they are 
willing to constitutionalise European rights above Spanish law. Whereas the value-based 
Constitution would not allow a judicial review of legislation, we see here that the right-based 
Constitution permits entrenchment of procedural guarantees. It grants constitutional status to 
the political rights that are represented by the ECT. So, the Professors are willing to review 
the national Magna Carta which signals perhaps that they want the process of EU institution 
building to continue. This is believed to strengthen the application of the third strategy.  
The professor in European Law, Carvajal, who appeared with a problem-solving attitude 
earlier, employed a different posture in the finale of the campaign. He claimed that national 
Constitutions have to adapt to the new constitutional text (EP 17/02/05b). Throughout the 
article, he gives the ECT priority over national laws and urges the Spanish people to see the 
Treaty as a reflection of the Spanish Constitution. While he seems to take on a right-based 
attitude, as soon as Carvajal sees the ECT as a reflection of the national Magna Carta, this is 
somewhat doubted. If the ECT involves and reflects the same groundwork of principles that 
has evolved in Spain, then this could be considered as a Constitution rooted in a set of pre-
political values (Fossum and Menéndez 2005:110). This would rather support a value-based 
notion of legitimation. It is important to distinguish between conceiving of the ECT as an 
emulator of already established cultural norms and as an independent European process that 
propounds a procedural notion of legitimation beyond national control. Only the latter could 
imply a right-based legitimation of the EU. So when Carvajal claimed that Spain’s 
Constitution had to be adjusted to the ECT while he saw it as a reflection of national charter, 
he is considered to conceive of the EU as a value-based community and emphaise an idea of 
a wider cosmopolitan entity simultaneously. 
A former member of the Spanish Congress, Fabra Vallés described the ECT as a culmination 
of a 15 year long European process (EP 24/12/04). The process represented a Europe that 
had changed geopolitical scenery, advanced from various treaties and expanded 
geographically. The European model was unique and was the most important example of an 
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organisation founded on the principles of pluralism, democracy and solidarity. The EU had 
ensured peace and progress for all its members. Here, he appears to perceive the Union 
within a procedural notion which means that the polity is legitimised through continuously 
responding to the peoples’ needs. At the same time, he said that the ECT would represent the 
same foundation as the national constitutions do today and it establishes the competences 
transferred to the European level from the members. With reference to this, he called the 
ECT a proof of a united continent of diversity. This is seen to underpin the right-based model 
because he sees the ECT as a process outside national jurisdiction and with competences that 
surpass national laws. [The ECT] reaffirms the European project’s values, goals and 
compromises made during 15 years of process, he finally said. It is relevant to understand his 
idea of a European Constitution as playing the same role as the national constitutions have 
traditionally done. 
7.2 REGIONAL RIGHT-BASED ARGUMENTS 
When the regional parties were introduced earlier, they were assumed to have a value-based 
conception of legitimacy, expressed through deep diversity. Arguments in favour of a 
judicial establishment in Europe were also found. Their motivation to develop political rights 
and democratic procedures at European level was often fostered by a wish to achieve 
regional recognition and to be treated as an equal to the Spanish State. 
7.2.1 The Basque region  
While the Basque party PNV had few value-based utterances, the majority is believed to 
emphasise a rights-induced European polity. The report talked warmly about the new 
personality the EU developed into with the ECT (PNV 2004:6). The EU converts into an 
active subject on the global scene and into the incumbent of international rights and 
obligations. The report further asserted that the EU’s own judicial personality would change 
the nation-state’s sovereignty as the EU’s power would prevail over domestic law (ibid:7). 
This was seen as convenient for PNV. The ECT was then pictured as granting citizens, 
through the establishment of a popular initiative, the particular ability to initiate the 
elaboration of a European legislative act (ibid).  
These statements are believed to highlight the judicial character of the EU. PNV predicts a 
change of judicial prevalence and presents the EU as a supranational level of governance. 
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The concept of private autonomy was also brought up when they spoke of popular initiative. 
As such, a right-based conception of the Union seems to characterise PNV’s statements.   
PNV further wrote that the ECT would strengthen the European citizenship by representing 
the source of civil and political rights. The ECT tries to establish formulas to level out the 
different citizenships and make it possible for the diverse identities in the communities to live 
together (PNV 2004:7). This means that a European citizenship was distinguished from a 
national citizenship by being driven by supranational legislative organs. The ECT was then 
depicted to underline a Europe of multiple identities that allowed an equalisation of 
citizenship (ibid:8). The ECT seems to have given symbolic support to the Basque identity 
and entitled them to see their nation as equivalent to other European identities. In this way, 
the EU appears responsive to the Basque identity. This fortifies the application of the third 
model. A European citizen was referred to as one who was entitled to address the European 
institutions in its own language and had the right to be responded in this language (ibid:12).  
Then, Germany’s, Austria’s and Belgium’s regional participation in the EU was brought up 
(ibid:8). PNV envisaged a polity that would defend the Basque region to the same extent 
other European regions had already been included. This issue corresponds to the third 
model’s expectation to allocate competences among different levels of government. PNV 
seemed to view the ECT as leading a process of institution building where the regions of 
Europe are integrated in its judicial entrenchments. In the conclusion, they wrote that the 
ECT follows a positive direction in the process towards a major European integration 
(ibid:14). In other words, PNV is thought to welcome a future post-national European order 
as long as it treats their region separately from Spain. So, when they concluded that no 
federalists would want this Treaty, it is assumed they want no federal Europe that is based on 
Member States, but on nations. However, the third model posits that the Union is federally 
structured. It would be necessary to add that such a structure is founded on a Europe of 
nations. The model does, in a way, predict that the EU is founded on nations because its 
legitimacy is contingent on compliance from the multiple identities in Europe. Therefore, it 
is likely to evaluate PNV’s non-federal image of the EU as a legitimation through rights. 
PNV’s leader Imaz, whose perspective of the EU did not fully speak to the second model. In 
June 2004, he described the EU as the most just and balanced social project in the world 
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which guaranteed social welfare of future generations31. Then, some months later, he 
claimed that each nation has the right to develop itself (…) each step implies more Europe 
and less Spain and France, referring to the ECT as one of these steps (EP 29/11/04). Imaz 
seems to depict Europe within a larger cosmopolitan order in these two occasions because he 
envisions the Union as a substitute for the nation-state. More Europe would help the Basque 
region to develop itself and reduce Spain’s influence. Each nation stresses his conception of 
a Europe built upon different identities instead of different states. In another article, he 
fortified the idea of a borderless EU. The EU constructs a social, cultural and economic 
reality and in the future, common politics, thanks to the common space developing beyond 
the States32. Imaz conception is seen to underline the third strategy because the European 
construction represents a process outside national governments’ control. However, we ought 
to pay attention to his use of the term nation which has earlier been connected to the second 
model. Here, it appears an adherence between the Basque nation and the EU because it has 
the right to develop itself and not because of common values or a shared history.  
An interesting observation on PNV’s position is when PP claimed that the ECT’s principles 
do not open up for any Basque exclusion, division or secession (EP 08/02/05b). As we have 
seen, Rajoy and Zapatero saw the Treaty as a way to diminish nationalists’ claim for self-
rule. While PP’s Yes was a No to the Ibarretxe Plan (EP 16/02/05b), PNV did not approve 
the ECT unless it included principles from the Ibarretxe Plan. This displays the ECT as a 
document that has been interpreted in two quite conflicting ways.  
7.2.2 The Catalan region 
In the Catalan political sphere, there were a couple of utterances where the Catalan people 
were seen as entitled to rights with the ECT. Maragall was earlier assumed to place PSC’s 
posture within the second model, but some of these statements are also believed to highlight 
the third strategy, as the EU is seen as the widening space of contention between Europeans. 
In January, Maragall asserted that Catalonia’s proper personality is favoured in a Europe of 
federal roots (LR 12/01/05). The same day he was quoted in El País (12/01/05c). I thank the 
socialists for opening the door towards recognition of Catalan in Europe and I predict a 
future without frontiers (…) the EU will continue our Catalan project. Later in January, he 
                                              
31 http://www.ucm.es/cgi-bin/show-prensa?mes=06&dia=2&ano=2004&art=30&tit=b (2006, October 2) 
32 http://www.diariodenoticias.com/ediciones/2005/02/15/politica/espana-mundo/d15esp20.221858.php 
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proclaimed PSC’s unmistakable Europeanist trajectory (EP 24/01/05). He finally urged 
Catalonia to drive Spain’s boat of pluralism towards a Europe that guarantees diversity 
(ibid). To which conception do these utterances speak to? Catalonia’s personality refers to 
the Catalan identity and its uniqueness. Maragall has already claimed that their identity is 
defended as the EU is sensitive to its diversity. For this reason, he is seen to carry a rights-
based notion of legitimation. When he uses terms like pluralism, guarantee and without 
frontiers, these emphasise his conception of a rights-induced EU. The Catalan Europeanist 
trajectory is seen as a pathway towards a European polity that is capable to defend Catalan 
personality and values. If the EU continues its institution building, the Catalan identity is 
predicted to receive recognition and strength. He finally said, since Europe is so grand, it 
cannot be centralist (ibid). The EU needs to allocate its competences among different levels 
of government such as regions. This would give emphasis to Maragall’s deep diversity. 
What about the article’s title? Maragall proclaims PSC to be the heir of Catalan 
Europeanist tradition (EP 24/01/05). If Catalonia has traditionally been Europeanist; a role 
transcended to the socialist Catalan party, does this imply that there is a value-community 
between the Catalan region and Europe? If Catalonia has always felt European and that PSC 
now takes over the role to proclaim this Europeanist vocation, would it not imply that the 
region has already developed an adherence to Europe through history? Maybe Catalonia 
feels a unity with Europe because they have always (traditionally) felt as a part of Europe. In 
this way, Maragall perceives the EU within a history-perspective too, which allows the 
second model to be applied. This makes it difficult to separate deep diversity statements that 
show history-dependent allegiance or procedural (active) adherence to the Union. 
A week before the referendum, PSC’s leader said that Catalonia feels totally European and 
wants to be looked at as totally recognised in the mosaic of people in Europe (EP 
12/02/05a). He referred to the ECT as the construction of the European dream. He also 
described the ECT as an instrument that strengthens the development of the Catalan identity 
in the EU community. That Catalonia feels totally European may imply that Catalans are 
about to or have developed a European identity. This Europeanism is seen as a rights-
induced notion of legitimacy. When he points at Europe’s mosaic, it is the diversity of 
identities in the EU. In this perspective, the Catalans may see the ECT as sensitive to their 
identity. This makes them perhaps become self-conceived European right-holders.  
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Maquel Iceta, PSC’s spokesman, did also emphasise the party’s right-based position when 
he stated that the ECT made the EU more democratic than the present system because it 
establishes double legitimacy, (…) strengthens rights, establishes a European citizenship 
and a judicial personality to the Union (EP 15/02/05b). Double legitimacy refers to a polity 
that is depended on the inclusion of European citizens and their governments to make sure 
that Europe’s diversity is reflected in the law-making. Hence, Iceta perceived the ECT as a 
step in the process of further institution building in Europe where citizens are presumed to 
act to ensure their enforcement onto EU policy-making. In this way, his conception is 
supporting the right-based notion, but in the same sentence, he said that the ECT is founded 
on values and signals common goals. These values and goals reflect a sense of togetherness 
that is believed to have arisen as a result of Europeans collective destiny and future common 
projects. In such a perspective, a collective self-determination is seen to engender a we-
feeling inside the European institutional project.  
7.2.3 The Canarian region 
The last regional party in favour of the ECT was CC from the Canary Islands. They did not 
have any value-based arguments, but they described the EU as a rights-granter to the regions. 
In January 2005, the Canarian Statute (their political goals) was described as leaving aside 
the Spanish Constitution and that its imperative character had been settled in the European 
Constitution (EP 31/01/05). Later on, CC argued that the EU recognises the best of the 
islands in the international sphere in their history (EP 04/02/05a). According to the 
Canarian Government’s homepage, the ECT definitively recognised the Canarian ultra-
periferic condition. The normative recognition the Canary Islands have achieved within 
Europe was undeniable33. A normative recognition involved being European citizens in a 
territory geographically outside Europe. By saying so, CC seems to appreciate that the EU 
recognises them. As this is based on an entitlement of being European citizens, it is seen as a 
support of the third model. Due to CC’s periferic position, the ECT and the EU were 
evaluated as better protectors of the region than Spain was. 
7.3 PSOE’S RIGHT-BASED ATTITUDE 
The governing party and its leader presented the ECT some times as a proof of democratic 
progress and of a European citizenry. As for the application of the right-based strategy, 
                                              
33 http://www.gobcan.es/reformaestatuto/reforma/europea.html (2006, May 24).   
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arguments from Zapatero were more frequently observed than his colleagues. The section 
below is therefore divided into the Prime Minister’s statements and then other PSOE-related 
participants in the debate.  
7.3.1 Prime Minister Zapatero 
One of Zapatero’s first announcements about the ECT was in the Congress: The widened 
Europe needs a Constitution, a new judicial mark that absorbs the citizens’ aspirations and 
gives responses to opportunities and challenges of this new phase of living together (CO 
15/06/04). The Prime Minister is assumed to see the EU as developing into a post-national 
entity framed by a Constitution that is reflective of its citizens needs. It is reasonable to 
apply the right-based model to this statement. When he some months later in the Congress 
defended the regional autonomies’ position, he spoke of this new phase in clearer terms. 
First, he said, the ECT opens up rooms for regional participation, new rooms, where they 
have the right to form decisions in the EU sphere (CO 22/09/04). By underlining the 
regions’ rights to participate, the onus rests on private autonomy. Then he said, no matter 
what ideology a person has (…) with an Europeanist determination, the person will 
recognise itself in the contents of the European Constitution. He continued the EU has been 
a grand project for Europeans and for all Spaniards; it has signified progress, democracy, 
strength in the world and values that you definitely share. This last phrase indicates that a 
community of values has arisen between Europeans. These are not seen as rooted values, but 
as privileges the EU has established. The reason for supposing so is that Zapatero had 
already described the Union as an including polity as long as there was European vocation. 
With this, he predicted people to be self-conceived rights-holders. Zapatero presumes that 
there is a we-feeling among these right-carriers. This involves a judicially entrenched Union 
that has emanated from a broad public debate of Europeans as well as non-Europeans.  
By looking at a later announcement, Zapatero pointed to the ECT as the answer to the EU’s 
challenges because it embodies a common space of peace, security, rights and liberties 
which are values the [European] Constitution defends (EP 27/11/04). He continued, the 
socialists must be the most powerful voice in the defence of the European Constitution. The 
socialist stance was highlighted because they defend social rights he said. This utterance is 
interpreted as a right-based conception of the EU’s legitimacy. He sees the EU as founded on 
common values that originate from the EU’s judicial framework. These values are believed 
to work as guarantees as much as they have a uniting effect. A we-feeling arises when 
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citizens become self-conceived rights-holders, equivalent to Iceta’s statement. That Zapatero 
urged the socialist stance to embrace the ECT is interpreted as speaking on behalf of this 
group and not that the European project is determined to fulfil socialist ideas.  
Then finally, in an intervention (ZAP 01/03/05), Zapatero had an interesting comment. His 
statement was that there is no contradiction between pertaining to Europe and the love for 
its own country. He looks at Spain’s relationship to the EU as a dual citizenship and says 
when a citizen belongs to two units and not only to the national, the traditional way of 
looking at citizenship is changed. The way a citizenship is described here, reveals an idea of 
a wider cosmopolitan conception of democracy. It is reasonable to see his legitimation of the 
EU as affected by deep diversity because fraternity to a nation and to Europe is merged into 
one concept of citizenry. He is assumed to posit an image of the EU that continues institution 
building and introduces a new way of looking at a citizenry. This image points at core 
aspects of the European process that have been predicted by the third model. 
7.3.2 Other representatives from PSOE 
Fernández de la Vega was earlier described as having a value-based posture, also when she 
compared the two Constitutions. However, it is reasonable to apply the third model as well. 
She said, Europe is about an ideal; a common interest that goes beyond a market and the 
practical share of political values and continued, there will be no room for liberty, peace, 
progress and social justice, if not [Europe’s] citizens engage themselves in its construction 
(EP 06/11/04). When she evaluated the EU’s citizens as indispensable in the formation of a 
legitimate Constitution, she legitimises the EU through rights. That she underlines a common 
interest gives associations to a European people that have obtained a we-feeling. Europeans’ 
engagement in constructing an EU based on common values is seen to engender this feeling. 
She finally said that the ECT strengthens the protection of regional and linguistic diversities 
which reiterates a right-based attitude. The total impression of de la Vega’s posture in this 
article is that she has a right-based legitimation of the EU. As she was presumed to regard 
the ECT as reinforcing the values of the Spanish Constitution, her posture changes from 
supporting the second to the third model. Her position is an example of how a person is 
believed to emphasise two modes of legitimation in the same setting.  
A few days later, she claimed that Spain had had little public culture in foreign affairs. We 
must now convert our external politics into the citizens’ politics. And by the citizens. 
Because it is a democratic imperative (Fernández de la Vega 2004:3). She went on, to be a 
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European citizen involves social safety. Even though there are divergent languages and 
cultures in Europe, the EU with the ECT protects these, the Constitution is a decisive step in 
judicial, political and symbolic terrains (…) among its main objectives are the definite 
incorporation of citizens in the European process (ibid:5). De la Vega allowed the European 
citizens to play a crucial role in the ECT and in the future EU process. Her understanding 
seems to be that the EU is contingent on compliance with fundamental individual rights. As 
such, private autonomy seems to be a core in her argumentation. 
Garrido argued in the Congress (25/01/05) that the ECT is a qualitative step towards a 
political Europe where specific universal values and objectives appear and whose evolution 
would become of great importance for Spanish citizens because it would indicate the 
development of a Europe of citizens. He also told his audience that the ECT would be 
superior to the Spanish Constitution. Garrido showed a right-based attitude because he 
envisaged the Union to develop a particular set of principles that spurred the development of 
a European citizenship. In addition, he placed the ECT above the national Constitution. 
Later, this attitude was reiterated in El País (18/02/05a), where he described the EU as the 
citizens’ Europe absorbing the values of citizenship and he called the ECT the most inclusive 
and amplest Constitution ever known. The ECT was hence seen as a Treaty that entrenched 
essential rights that fostered a European citizenship and that manifested the multitude of 
European diversity. On this basis, the right-based strategy is likely to be emphasised.  
Foreign Minister Moratinos’ statements were in the beginning presumed to have an 
instrumental character. The same day he guaranteed for Spain’s interests, he was quoted in 
ABC (20/06/04b): Accepting the Constitution is not about winning or losing, but about an 
enlarged view of the EU where new directions outweigh the lost benefits. He warned about 
using a calculator and said that Spain would ratify the Constitution because we have fulfilled 
our motive of European vocation and because we feel European (ibid). Since he talks about 
an enlarged view of the EU new directions, it might indicate a process of institution 
building. At the same time, his statement may refer to how Europe’s historical roots have 
given the membership a deeper meaning as they seemed to always have been Europeanists.  
Five days earlier, Moratinos urged the Spanish people to involve themselves more in the 
citizenship in order to construct, together with the Governments, a European project34. He 
                                              
34 http://www.ucm.es/cgi-bin/show-prensa?mes=06&dia=15&ano=2004&art=70&tit=b  (2006, September 26) 
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pointed to the European federalist spirit as a stimulus to citizens’ engagement. His statement 
can be interpreted in two ways. First, Moratinos may have had a European citizenship in 
mind that was founded on multiple identities and their local political representatives (as in 
Governments). European citizens would be inspired by a federalist idea and seek to enlarge 
the Union’s capabilities and areas of competence (the European project). Second, a 
federalist spirit does not necessarily point towards a post-national polity. Moratinos might 
have referred to the Spanish citizenship and to their State Government. A federal Europe 
would be based on an interaction between Member States and their concomitant citizens. 
This would be an underpinning of a functional Union that was dependent on its members. 
However, the point is to illustrate how European federalist spirit does not necessarily imply 
a cosmopolitan idea of the EU. Yet, when we look at further utterances from the Foreign 
Minister, it is reasonable to depict his posture as supporting the right-based strategy.  
In the Congress (18/10/05), he was worried about the EU reducing into a mere market. This 
new phase of European integration could not land without its citizens, referring to the 
citizens of los pueblos. Here, his focus rests on private autonomy while the regions’ 
(pueblos) role supposes a Europe based on stateless borders. One month later, he called the 
ECT a demonstration of how the citizens of Europe are involved and reflected in the EU as 
opposed to the Member States (EM 14/11/04). Altogether, Moratinos seemed to depict the 
EU as allocating competences between different levels of government and urge Europeans to 
recognise as relevant to the construction of a European polity. His focus rested thus on the 
relevance of regions to be politically activated. This portrays Moratinos’ attitude as 
fortifying the right-based notion of legitimation.  
Camilo Nogueira, an ex-deputy from the Galician Socialists, uttered that the consolidation of 
the Union, with diminishing historical frontiers and the creation of a European citizenship, 
establishes a skilful and achievable pathway towards a direct election of a Parliament that 
will make use of the already written Constitution (…) where its unity is affirmed and where 
the diversity of all European “pueblos” are absorbed (EP 14/02/05). Here, Nogueira 
depicted the ECT to be leading the EU towards a more institutionalised polity and towards a 
post-national entity with a direct Parliamentary election. He predicted borders to disappear 
and a European citizenship to arise. This fosters an idea of a wider cosmopolitan Union. In 
the same article, he thanked Europe’s social traditions for allowing Europe to start to 
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constitute one of the poles with reference to the superpowers.  Even though he appreciated 
Europe’s social traditions, he is assumed to predict a post-national destiny of the EU.  
According to the Secretary for Equality (PSOE), Soledad Murillo, the ECT is more specific 
and effective concerning female and equality rights compared to the Spanish Constitution 
(EP 07/02/05b). She complained about Spain’s equality conditions where there is an 
enormous resistance towards employing women and there is twice as much female than male 
unemployment. Spanish women have a lot at stake with the approval of this Constitution, 
she finally said. The ECT provided equality rights that seemed to be better than those the 
Spanish Constitution defended. When European rights are evaluated as better protectors of 
females in the Spanish society, the third model’s concept of public autonomy is underpinned.  
A similar view of the EU was detected in Elena Valenciano’s utterances, a Socialist party-
member. In an article in El País (07/02/05a), she claimed that European rights appeared to be 
more sensitive to the values of feminine rights. She also claimed that Europe needed support 
from its citizens in order to secure a European project. Since no one in the Union feels more 
Europeanists than us Spaniards, the Treaty ought to be backed by us. Here, she sees that the 
EU shows reciprocity towards Spanish women and takes up the issue of public autonomy. 
She pictures the ECT as made by and for the people. Her formulation of an Europeanist 
vocation stems thus from a right-based legitimation of the EU. 
The Spanish Minister of Culture, Carmen Calvo, praised the ECT for being the first 
normative document that involves compulsion and that it is obligated to attend the cultural 
demands of the citizens (EP 27/01/05). She further admitted that the ECT absorbs different 
cultures and manages to be responsive to this diversity. Calvo saw it as possible to defend a 
European unity while respect the diversity of each society. When she described the ECT as 
reflecting the common will of European citizens despite their pre-political values and 
cultures, she posits a legitimation through rights. That she additionally regarded the Treaty 
as obligated to reflect the citizens’ voices refers to a mutual interaction between the 
European public and decision-makers. This idea does also emphasise the right-based model.  
7.4 PP’S RIGHT-BASED ATTITUDE 
Only one member from the Popular Party was found to utter a right-based argument. García-
Maragallo wrote an article about the ECT in El País (18/02/05b). His ambition was to deny 
that the EU was a gigantic supermarket without political control. He explained that the idea 
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of Europe springs from a political reflection that advances slowly towards a political union. 
The EU is founded on its interior territorial objectives such as peace, people’s well-being, 
internal market, sustainable development (…) economic cohesion and respect for cultural 
diversity. He further said, the EU’s external goals are the protection of human rights and 
observation of international law. To García-Maragallo, the Union’s goals seem to concern 
every European citizen, no matter cultural origin. This is thought to reveal the rights-based 
orientation of his utterance. At the same time, he envisages the EU project to develop 
towards a union that is based on certain core objectives; Europe signifies democracy, liberty 
and respect for other’s rights. These can be understood as a set of fundamental rights that all 
self-conceived European right-holders are entitled to employ.  
What is interesting about his opinion is that it did not emphasise any national interests. If we 
look at his position as a Euro deputy, this forms perhaps the reason to a fairly untraditional 
statement for being a PP-member. His relation to the EU gives him perhaps a more complex 
image of the European project which makes him less focused on the nation-state’s benefits 
and more Union-oriented. Considering this, he is perhaps not a very good representative for 
PP’s general position. This has already been suggested as it was the only argument from the 
Popular Party that allowed application of the third model.  
7.5 THE GENERAL PUBLIC’S RIGHT-BASED ATTITUDE 
Outside the political establishment, there were several arguments found that pointed towards 
a right-based legitimation of the EU. First, we look at some qualitative cases from El País.  
7.5.1 The general public in the newspapers 
Juan Manuel Fabra Vallés, President of the European Court of Auditors, referred to the ECT 
as confirming a political, economic and social model that describes a united continent of 
diversity (EP 24/12/04). He envisaged an approved ECT to convert into the fundamental 
charter for all European citizens, like the national Constitutions are today. Fabra Vallés 
placed the European project above national control that is united by its differences.  
Álvarez-Arenas, a member of the ‘Spanish Real Academy’, wrote an opinion in El País 
(31/12/04) where he clarified how the Constitution was a part of being European in Europe: 
To belong to Europe implicates to live actively now and to have lived actively in the past. He 
described the EU as a human union, a fusion of people’s ideals, convictions and beliefs, but 
he admitted it was a fusion of differences and individualities. His opinion is believed to take 
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a right-based position because he refers to an active European people. He also says that the 
ECT makes Spaniards feel European and to act like European citizens. An EU that 
represents a community of an active demos and that absorbs the basic needs of every 
European identity, engenders an image of a post-national entity. Also, when he said human 
union it gives the impression of an EU based on individual integrity. Even though rights or 
European citizenship was mentioned, his portrayal of the EU reflected a fusion of people that 
apparently saw themselves as the addresses and authors of European policy-making because 
they lived actively. 
A representative from the ‘Association of female victims of violence’ said, the European 
Constitution is a step towards equality (EP 13/01/05). Just like Murillo and Valenciano, the 
EU was seen to provide specific equality rights that would surpass the Spanish law because 
they were more relevant and better adjusted to women’s reality. It was also argued that the 
ECT would give more rights to homosexual people. The Constitution was called a good 
instrument to obtain rights for this group of people (EM 06/02/05). 
A candidate from European Syndicate Confederation, Méndez, described the ECT as a great 
tool in the defence of the European social model (…) the ECT recognises new employment 
and social rights that Spain has not made constitutional (EP 04/02/05b). He portrayed the 
Treaty as a better reflection of the Spanish citizens’ anticipations and claimed that the ECT 
supported non-discrimination of origin because the Constitution recognises the right of those 
who legally reside in the Union (…) to receive social security services. He also called the 
ECT a human necessity. Méndez approached the EU with a quite clear-cut conception of the 
EU. He regarded its judicial framework as more responsive to the Spanish people and 
underlines that everyone is entitled to EU rights, no matter origin. There is an underlying 
tone in the whole article that demonstrates a degree of ascendancy European law gradually 
employs over national jurisdiction. Thus, his position highlights clearly the third model.  
A Professor in ethics and political philosophy, Adela Cortina, sought to describe the 
European identity in an opinion article in El País (08/02/05c). Here, Europeans were thought 
to obtain dual identity; a national and a European one because the Treaty absorbed shared 
values that manifest the common foundation of all Europeans - respect for human dignity, 
liberty, democracy and equality, she said. This set of fundamental rights build the common 
ground for the European identity. A European identity is thus formed by the establishment 
of common values into rights. The ECT was seen as such a foundation. When she continued 
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that there is a dynamic between the existing values in the European countries and the EU’s 
judicial framework, she employs a receptive character to the EU polity. These values are not 
seen as rooted values, but as the reflection of an active European people that are cognisant of 
their entitlements and their act of enforcement on EU law. For this reason, Cortina is seen to 
have a right-based conception of the EU’s legitimacy. She even predicted the ECT to 
generate a cosmopolitan citizenship in the future, which reiterates this legitimation mode.  
Óscar Alzaga Villamil, who is Professor in Constitutional Law, wrote an opinion in El País 
February 12. He pictured the ECT as a judicial utility resort that would deepen the notion of 
a European citizenship. We have to equalise the fruits that emanate from the fundamental 
rights with our neighbours and permit ourselves to receive the Treaty’s advantages (EP 
12/02/05b). He also said that the EU must involve public opinions in the future to gain 
legitimacy and involve transferring sovereignty of certain political areas to European 
institutions. The Professor envisages Europe to develop into a right-based unity that offers a 
set of unique rights. The fruits are interpreted as privileges or rights that are manifested as a 
result of a deeper institutionalisation of the EU polity. As EU members are also predicted to 
transfer certain political control to Union-level, his conception of the EU emphasises the 
right-based notion of legitimation.  
An interesting description of the EU’s character compared to the nation-state was written by 
the journalist and philosopher, Josep Ramoneda. By implicitly favouring the ECT, he 
criticised the ones that calculated the Union’s political purpose (EP 17/02/05c). He explained 
how one should comprehend the European project in a wider perspective. It will never be a 
fatherland (…) because Europe has not closed or defined its borders (…) the EU is defined 
by its formal and open character that does not claim to impose a unilateral ambient. The 
underlying theme of the article was Europe’s character of including everyone who wanted to 
join disregarding their culture, language or nation. This is exactly the onus of the third 
model. It predicts the EU polity to have an including personality.  
7.5.2 The general public in the questionnaires 
If we look at the available quantitative data, few utterances pointed towards evident right-
based conceptions. However, some questions indicated a legitimation through rights. In the 
CIS (2005:P31), data reveal that 23 per cent of the Spanish people wanted the EU to have a 
true Government that would take the decisions (the EU-answer) while 58 per cent thought 
the Member State’s Government should have the last word (Member State-answer). As the 
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question included all types of voters, the researcher made a cross tabulation (Figure 7.1) of 
the voting pattern (P11) and this question (P31). The result of this indicates a slightly higher 
percentage of Yes-voters among those who chose the EU-answer (78%) compared to Yes-
voters that chose the Member State-answer (71%). The tabulation also shows highest 
correlation between voting Yes and choosing the EU-answer. However, the formulation of 
the alternatives may have had some implications on the respondents. To agree with a true 
European Government is a fairly strong statement that may have created a frightening image. 
If the alternative were: The EU ought to have a government that takes the final decision, it is 
likely that more people had agreed to this. The EU is then presented as less state-like, but 
with ascendancy over national sovereignty.   
What may strengthen the insinuations made above is a question from the first CIS 
(2004:P17). The people were asked which argument they agreed with: It would be good if 
the EU formed gradually into a federal Europe with powerful competences or In the future, 
each State must continue to maintain the major part of its competences. While 34 per cent 
agreed to the first, 48 per cent agreed to the last. Since these people had not voted yes, this 
question is not that relevant for this study. However, as it is seen to strengthen the latter CIS-
finding, it has been included. After a cross tabulation (Figure 7.2) of this question (P17) and 
the question about what they would vote if the referendum was that day (P5), the outcome 
was as predicted. There was a higher tendency of favouring the Treaty and answering 
Europe in P17 (49%), than answering State in P17 (40%). This demonstrates again a 
correlation between an ECT-support and wanting the EU to develop into a federal system. 
Nevertheless, these cross tabulations only give us an indication of how the ECT-supporters 
have a tendency towards favouring a federal Europe rather than a stronger Spanish State.  
Then, another data that perhaps indicates a right-based notion of legitimation comes from the 
CIS 2005. Spaniards were here asked to tell why they voted Yes to the ECT (P11a). They 
were confronted with seven alternative answers. The third highest percentage (15%) chose 
the alternative: The ECT creates a European citizenship. Considering the number of 
alternatives, 15 per cent is a significant amount. However, to believe the creation of a 
European citizenship does not necessarily demonstrate a right-based understanding of the 
EU. People may misunderstand the term and think that it involves just feeling as a part of 
Europe. Notably, previous European studies show that there is a tendency among Spaniards 
that to want to establish a European citizenship (EC 2001:10-11). Then, the alternative that 
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prompted most agreement (38.7%) was: It is indispensable in the continuance of European 
construction. This may also have an indication of the third model. The Spanish people might 
see the EU project as a process of deeper institution building. If so, it would locate a rights-
induced attitude among the Spaniards. 
Finally, the Report (2005:Q6f) tells us that 88 per cent of those who had voted Yes agreed 
that the adoption of the ECT would strengthen democracy (Q6). If democracy is interpreted 
as Europe’s democracy, it permits application of the third model. A more democratic system 
in Europe would imply increased public participation on EU level and thus more public 
influence on EU decision-making. If the respondents evaluated this aspect as inbuilt in the 
question, the third model is emphasised. However, democracy may also be interpreted as 
Spain’s democracy. This is reasonable if we think about how the EU membership has 
motivated Spain to develop democracy since Franco’s regime seized. Democracy would then 
be connected to domestic structures. This viewpoint legitimises the EU through its outcomes 
as it strengthens the nation-state rather than the EU community.  
If we take a closer look at this question, it appears quite inconsistent and unreasonable to 
vote Yes for the ECT and then answer that it does not strengthen democracy. Put in other 
words, there may be an obvious coherence between approving the ECT and regarding it as 
good for society, which makes the answer to this question fairly predictable. Then we could 
question, did these people know enough about the ECT to evaluate whose democratic 
structures it would improve? The Report provided a cross tabulation of agreement (Q6) and 
their knowledge of the Constitution. This revealed that a larger number of those with good to 
very good knowledge, agreed with its effects on democracy. This makes it more reliable to 
say that those who saw the ECT as a way of strengthening democracy had a good knowledge 
of the Treaty. And since the ECT actually focused more on the improvements of the EU’s 
democracy than on the Member State’s democracy, this strengthens the idea that people who 
agreed to Q6, referred to the Union’s democratic structure. 
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8. How did the No-stance argue? 
In the beginning of this thesis, there were made some assumptions that indicated which parts 
of the Spanish population were anticipated to vote Yes. It was assumed that the regions 
would feel a particular connection to the EU community and to its judicial system. This led 
to an approval of the ECT. The reason for pointing out the No-stance is to correct the third 
assumption and introduce an image of the Spanish population that maybe makes the 
evaluation somewhat different.  
Among the regional parties, five smaller ones rejected the ECT in addition to the Basque 
separatist group ETA. It is noteworthy that these did not call themselves anti-Europeanists in 
the ECT-campaigns. The Catalan party ERC and their leader claimed that they would vote 
Yes to Europe but No to the European Constitution (ESC 03/10/04). They also uttered that 
Europe provides the frame where they can express themselves rightly as nations (EP 
30/01/05b). Carod, the party leader, warned the Prime Minister that his party would not 
approve the ECT unless Catalan was officially acknowledged by the EU35. ERC also 
complained about the lack of social rights in the ECT and claimed it was made by right-
winged politicians (EP 05/02/05b). The party’s EU deputy, Bernat Joan, said that their No 
was a vote of Europeanist responsibility because (…) it is a constitutional treaty between 
States and not an authentic Constitution (EP 22/01/05). On basis of these utterances, ERC 
seems to have wanted a more definite judicial enclose of their nation. They wanted an EU 
that showed more responsiveness to European regions. Their conception of the EU was thus 
seen as rights-induced. 
ETA rejected the ECT because it did not recognise the rights of the Basque citizens and they 
called the EU the grand prison of the peoples (EP 09/02/05). This shows a similar opposition 
as the one of ERC. Their legitimation of the EU seems to be grounded in an idea of a 
defending, right-based and supranational entity where regions are equally treated as the 
Member States. PNV was at first opposing the Treaty. Their reason for rejecting it was that 
they supported a European project without borders where all languages deserve respect36.  
                                              
35 http://www.europadelospueblos.net/egunkaria_visor.php?DokId=7&Hizk=Cata (2006, January 13) 
36 http://www.ucm.es/cgi-bin/show-prensa?mes=06&dia=2&ano=2004&art=30&tit=b  (2006, September 13) 
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9. Concluding remarks of the Spanish utterances 
Three models have been used to assess Spanish Yes-arguments and announcements that have 
allowed an interpretation of the people’s conception of the EU. The main purpose of this 
study was to endeavour a nuanced answer to the question: Which conceptions of the EU’s 
legitimacy motivated the Spanish people to vote Yes to the ECT? It is now due time to 
evaluate the different models and map the Spanish tendency. It is though not my intention to 
land on one strategy, but to evaluate which one appeared more often in certain occasions.  
9.1 EVALUATION OF THE FIRST APPLICATION 
It was possible to detect instrumental ideas of the EU both on the political and public level. 
PSOE and the Prime Minister emphasised that the EU had contributed considerably to 
ensure Spanish wealth and progress. While one of eleven statements pointed towards a mere 
calculative view of the EU, the other ten, revealed that they did not only see the Treaty in a 
cost-benefit perspective. A statement did usually start to mention tangible benefits about the 
membership or the Treaty. Then, they pointed towards an Europeanist vocation or an 
adherence towards the Union. This made the problem-solving model fall short of describing 
PSOE’s posture. However, it is important to delineate that their statements did occasionally 
involve focus on national benefits some times. 
The opposing party, uttered more arguments on how Spain had to defend national interests in 
their support of the ECT. Even though they evaluated the ECT as good for all Europeans, 
there was a clear message to the party in power that they ought to think of what was best for 
Spain. The party leader, Rajoy, did also depict the ECT as a good instrument in the struggle 
against regional desires for self-rule. An impression from PP’s statements was that they did 
not call themselves anti-Europeanists (although no statements said that they were 
Europeanists), but that they ought not to forget what was best for the country. An underlying 
character of PP’s attitude was preservation of national interests and an intergovernmental 
view of the EU. This made it easier to apply the first model to their arguments.  
The regions were not found with any arguments that would allow an application of the first 
model. The quantitative data however, may have pointed at a tendency among the Spanish 
general public that was instrumentally oriented towards the EU. Two questions allowed us to 
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apply the problem-solving model to the public sphere, but there was still strong hesitation 
connected to their ability to present a clear cut problem-solving perspective. 
9.2 EVALUATION OF THE SECOND APPLICATION 
It was demonstrated that there was a high degree of Europeanism among the Spanish people.  
A great deal of the utterances that revealed an Europeanist vocation, pointed towards a 
community-feeling that was founded on memories, common culture and ethical values. It 
was also detected that a feeling of unity, responsibility and adherence to the EU, formed this 
Europeanism. These people regarded the EU as manifested on a ground of common values.  
First, informed by deep diversity, while the Basque and Catalan parties defended their 
regional identity, they often connected to the EU’s historical and value foundation. It was of 
great importance to all three parties to obtain recognition of their regional languages. This 
recognition was some times seen to emphasise the value-based model. Europe was seen to 
give them a second option in recognising their identity and culture which Spain had failed to 
do. When they achieved responsiveness at EU level, set of shared values between the regions 
and Europe was detected. As a result, a we-feeling arose. Terms like patrimony, mother 
country and model were also used to describe the EU. Such vocabulary was seen to highlight 
basic elements in the second model. This leaves us with a model that to a certain extent 
managed to reflect Basque and Catalan perceptions. However, many statements from the 
regions referred to Europe’s judicial framework when they sought recognition. The concept 
of deep diversity was as such not only revealing a European adherence that had sprung from 
mutual respect and common values.  
PSOE emphasised clearly an Europeanist vocation that some times allowed an application of 
the second model. While the ECT-vote appeared to be the opportunity to appreciate 
European form of life, it also appeared opportune to demonstrate Europe’s strength and unity 
compared to the rest of the world. This positive identification of Europeans appeared 
frequently in PSOE’s statements compared to other parties. Together with seeing the ECT as 
a reflection of historical and cultural coherence between Europeans, PSOE seemed to 
emphasise the value-based strategy to a considerable degree. This became even more evident 
when we analysed the Popular Party’s statements. Even though some arguments portrayed 
the Treaty as strengthening European values, PP’s support of the Treaty seemed to depend 
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on a protection of national interests. Their occasional emphasis on Europe did thus not allow 
a complete application of the value-based notion of legitimation.  
To a certain extent, it was possible to detect a legitimation through the EU’s values among 
the general public. While showing solidarity seemed to be one of the main reasons for ECT-
support, there was also a tendency of looking at the EU as a community that was growing 
stronger than rest of the world. With support from earlier studies, it was also demonstrated 
that Spaniards have tended to relate certain values to the European project. However, like the 
other employments of the quantitative data, there was uncertainty connected to the findings.   
9.3 EVALUATION OF THE THIRD APPLICATION 
The comparison between the national and European Constitution showed that only a few 
statements portrayed the ECT as a prolongation of the national Constitution and refused to 
revise it. More statements pictured the ECT to be superior to the Spanish Constitution. These 
utterances were seen as emphasising the third model as the majority of the utterances did see 
it as necessary to reform the national charter if any adjustments were to be done. The 
Professors that made this comparison have supposedly analysed the ECT quite well and their 
opinions are thought to be representative for the political stance and the general public. 
However, although it appeared as quite serious steps to take to adjust Spain’s Constitution, 
one must bear in mind that they were talking about reviewing one sentence. 
It was quite obvious that there were more statements from the Basque and Catalan political 
stance that emphasised the right-based notion of legitimation. They regarded the ECT as a 
step towards an enlarged European institutional frame. This was evaluated as convenient for 
their regions as they predicted it would increase the possibilities of protection of regional 
development. The Catalan parties seemed to talk more about making a Europe without 
frontiers because the EU polity guaranteed diversity and made the regions see themselves as 
constitutive of the right-based entity. The Basque party appeared more focused on increasing 
their autonomy. PNV’s report evaluated the EU as an entity of nations where each nation 
was recognised. This would engender self-rule for the Basque region. Notably, both PSOE 
and PP appreciated how the Treaty hindered such separatist ideas. A reasonable explanation 
to this contradiction is that the regional parties foresaw a change in citizenship rather than an 
exclusion from Spain. The EU offered a set of political rights and guarantees which rendered 
the regional identifications reflexive. The ECT did also represent a framework on security 
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that would work against separatist struggle, but not against an individual process of self-
conceiving right-holder. In this way, the regional parties as opposed to PSOE and PP are 
thought to be concerned about in two separate matters that also would emphasise two 
different modes of legitimation. The contradiction results in one conflict with two solutions. 
Statements from PSOE could often be linked to a right-based notion. The ECT was seen as 
an element in the process towards a strengthened EU institution building. It was also about a 
defence of the plural identities in Europe. Zapatero described the ECT as introducing a new 
type of citizenship which underlined the EU’s particular set of citizen rights. There were 
quite a few PSOE-representatives that spoke in the Congress with ideas connected to a 
supranational EU. This made it easier to employ the third strategy to PSOE’s argumentation. 
The Popular Party approached the ECT-debates with less focus on what sort of judicial 
framework the EU presented. There was only one right-based statement notably emanating 
from an EU deputy. Altogether, PP seemed less involved in the EU as a post-national and 
law-creating entity which corresponds well with my judgment of them as supporting an EU 
of intergovernmental character.  
Finally, the general public was divided into two sections where the first one, emanating from 
El País, gave the best portrayal of the Spanish public next to the questionnaires. These non-
political debaters appreciated particular European rights that they meant were reflexive and 
sensitive to the current Spanish society. They represent the more active part of the public as 
they are related to associations and trade union, but still, they are presumed to channel the 
public voice to a significant extent. The questionnaires indicated that there was a some 
relation between voting Yes and seeing the EU as receiving more decision-making power. 
The impression was that Spaniards were cognisant to which type of polity the ECT spoke.  
9.4 CONCLUSIONS 
The use of the three models equipped the researcher with an analytical tool that has proved 
different modes of EU legitimation. The overall impression of the Spanish Yes-vote is that 
was motivated by a value-based and right-based legitimation of the EU more than by a 
result-based legitimation. For this reason, the Popular Party’s argumentation eventuates as 
somewhat exceptional to what the Spanish tendency seems to have been. That they had an 
opposing position and was the second biggest party may have affected their way of arguing. 
PP’s Yes to the ECT did implied less EU related issues compared to other parties as 
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demonstrated. Closa and Heywood’s description of PP’s character was thus supported. In 
addition, when PSOE defended their Yes in an instrumental way, this is not considered to 
weaken the application of the other two models to PSOE’s posture. Still, it is seen as a 
relevant observation that they did not always approach the EU in value- or right-oriented 
terms. As for PP, they argued mainly through the calculus of costs-benefits. The few times 
they emphasised elements in the other models, it gave us a more complete picture of PP’s 
general attitude, but the application of the first model is still not significantly doubted. 
The quantitative data seemed to underpin what the political establishment had uttered. 
Despite analytical difficulties connected to the quantitative analysis, the utterances from the 
general public in El País and the findings in the questionnaires appeared as quite consistent 
with the political arguments. This supports my assumption on a political establishment that 
would reflect a large part of the public voice. However, the regional voice did not have any 
support from the quantitative data. This might be a weakness to the reliability of findings 
based on the regional parties which ought to be considered in the evaluation of a general 
posture of the Basques, Catalans and Canarian people.   
A generally high degree of Europeanism inbuilt in Spaniards’ minds and hearts was already 
well-known and measured before this study took place. This analysis reaffirmed this 
Europeanism, especially in PSOE’s approach to the ECT and the EU. The newness of this 
research though, is that it has proved a particular connection between the different regional 
layers of the Spanish society. Whereas they had been characterised as below the average of 
feeling European in previous studies their statements about the ECT revealed quite the 
opposite. Their motivation to support the Treaty rested mainly on the value-based and right-
based impetus of the European polity. This idea was strengthened when we had a look on the 
No-arguments from the regions. In general, the regional stance appeared as concerned in 
pursuing a process of European institution building and in giving the EU’s judicial 
framework ascendancy over national law.  
The political establishment and their statements were quite often pointing towards different 
conceptions of the EU’s legitimacy. It was not even found significant changes of their 
statements over time. However, there seems to be two reasonable explanations. One, the 
utterance was affected by the particular context and social expectations, and was therefore 
not representative for the person’s general posture. Two, the person did not have a clear cut 
and complete picture of why he or she voted Yes. As we saw, statements from PP appeared 
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inconsistent in their way of approaching the ECT. Was their Yes a No to the Government or 
did their decision leave out domestic politics? Three, the operationalisation of the models 
was not good enough to interpret the people’s utterances. This was often the case when 
statements allowed application of the second and third strategy at the same time. In one 
setting, the person could emphasise European history and shared cultural principles. In 
another setting, the same person could envisage the EU to establish a proper set of values 
that were reflexive of the European multitude today. Four, the way to operationalise the 
second model is founded on a set of mechanisms that seems to conflict with the 
operationalisation of the third model. The two latter points will be further looked on below. 
The regional parties suggested an EU orientation of deep diversity as they manifested a 
belonging both to the regional and European polity. The onus of legitimacy was therefore on 
how national identity was fortified together with European allegiance. It was some time 
difficult to analyse such a combination. As we have seen, PSC’s leader Maragall called 
Catalonia as traditionally Europeanist. This does probably imply that Catalonia’s connection 
to Europe’s history has engendered certain rooted values that make the region Europeanist. 
At the same time, Maragall legitimise the EU through its rights by saying The EU will 
continue our Catalan project. This caused difficulties in deciding which legitimation mode 
actually described his posture.  
This challenge made the researcher look more carefully at the operationalisation of the two 
models. In chapter 2, there were made some suggestions of how one strategy was expected 
to appear in the Spanish debates and gain support. It is possible that this operationalisation 
was not specific enough. I could perhaps have stipulated more clearly, which terms or 
attitudes had to inform the statement in order to support one of the models. At the same time, 
this could be a vain attempt especially in regard with the second strategy. Each statement 
was a unique way of referring to personal values and feelings. It often required a complete 
understanding of the person’s aspirations to make use of its argument.  
The abovementioned challenge did also make the researcher scrutinise the very mechanisms 
forming the prospects of the EU’s legitimacy. It was mainly the second and third model that 
had generated difficulties. The value-based legitimation required statements to describe the 
people’s identity, their feelings of belonging or their ethical values which they knew they 
shared with other Europeans. The right-based model required statements to reveal that the 
person was engaged in the EU’s law and that European rights were responsive to his or hers 
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preferences. Whereas the third model focuses on the EU’s structural and institutional 
foundation where participation and deliberation are core elements, the second model focuses 
on the intersubjective shared values and traditions that are constitutive of Europe more than 
on specific formulas of politically organising the EU. Considering this, there seems to be 
considerable difference as to what mechanisms found the two legitimation modes. The 
consequence might have been that certain utterances in the Spanish debate gave emphasis to 
a value-based and a right-based conception of the EU at the same time.  
Finally, in my opinion, this analysis has proven that there is a tendency of legitimising the 
EU towards a new way. Even though the Spanish people seem not to have forgotten the 
many benefits Spain has received from the EU, it is also about a European feeling that has 
engendered responsibility and appreciation among Spaniards. The Spanish people feel 
European. They have demonstrated that they want to be constitutive of a polity that is 
founded on European fundamental principles and rights. It also appears as if they are 
cognisant of the emerging entity the EU is evolving into; being something else than a state, 
but more than an intergovernmental organisation. At the same time, there was a certain 
inclination of connecting the ECT to national benefits. Yet, those arguments did not seem to 
inform a general attitude among the Spanish Yes-voters. Then, the regional representatives 
seemed convinced about the ECT’s responsiveness towards their identity and dignity. 
Though through deep diversity, the Basque, Catalan and Canarian people appeared 
emotionally inspired and engaged in the direction of European political and judicial 
development the Treaty was indicating. Compared to previous studies, this regional 
connection to Europe seemed to be out of the ordinary.  
On the basis of this, I am inclined to deduce that the Spanish conceptions of the EU’s 
legitimacy have transcended considerably beyond the problem-solving notion of 
legitimation. It has proved that the Spaniards perceive the EU as moving towards a 
community based on socio-cultural roots and with the capacity of including and responding 
to the very multitude of identities in Spain.  
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Quantitative data comparison between El País and Le Monde 
 
El País: 20/01/05 till 20/02/05      Number of times: 
Search on Constitución europea       433 
Search on Tratado constitucional europea      22 
Search on Tratado europeo        50 
Sum:  508 
 
Le Monde: 28/04/05 till 28/05/05      Number of times: 
Search on Constitution européenne       500 
Search on Traité constitutionnel européenne     228 
Search on Traité européen        486 
         Sum:  1214 
 
Cross tabulations 
Figure 7.1:  
P 11 ↓  / P 31→ The EU-answer The Member State-answer 
Yes  78% (300) 71% (590) 
No 12% (44) 15% (124) 
 
Figure 7.2: 
P 5 ↓  / P 17→ Good to form a federal Europe Good that the State maintains 
In favour 49% (396) 40% (463) 
Against 7% (55) 6% (70) 
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List of Abbreviations 
CC Coalición Canaria; centre-right party composed by different nationalist 
groupings from the Canary Islands.  
CiU  Convergència i Unió; Catalan alliance, majority and governing party in 
Catalonia for more than two decades. Nationalists.  
CIS  Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas; Centre that produces pre- and post-
election polls to study the characteristics and trends of citizens’ voting habits. 
CDC  Convergència Democratica de Catalunya; Catalan party that forms part of 
CiU. Jordi Pujol (ex President of Catalonia) was the leader of CDC. 
ERC Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya; left-wing Catalan party that campaigns 
for independence from Spain and France. It is one of the three coalition 
members of the Generalitat today (May 2006) and its current President is 
Josep-Lluís Carod-Rovira.  
ETA Euskadi Ta Askatasuna; (Basque for: Basque Homeland and Freedom). 
Basque nationalist organisation that seeks to create an independent socialist 
state, separate from Spain and France. Considered as a terrorist organisation 
by the EU, Spain, France and USA. 
PP  Partido Popular; largest liberal conservative party, centre-right wing. Head of 
opposition today (May 2006) in Spain. Governing party from 1996 to 2004 
led by Prime Minister José María Aznar.  
PNV  Partido Nacionalista Vasco; Basque party, the largest Basque party whose 
leader is Juan José Ibarretxe and head of the Basque community. Ibarretxe 
was the one that proposed the Ibarretxe Plan.  
PSC  Partido Socialista de Catalunya; is federated with PSOE. Its President is 
Pasqual Maragall who is currently leading the Catalan Generalitat backed up 
by a coalition of two other left-wing Catalan parties (among them ERC).  
PSN  Partido Socialista de Navarra; is federated with PSOE. Navarra’s main party. 
PSOE  Partido Socialista Obrero Español; centre-left wing party, governing in 
Spain today (May 2006) and whose leader is J.L.R. Zapatero. 
 
 
